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Abstract 
Until recently, social assistance has received relatively little attention in the comparative welfare state 
literature, which is remarkable given its central function in combating poverty and pursuing social 
inclusion. This paper explores the developments of social assistance and minimum income benefits 
across 14 Western European countries, 12 Central and Eastern European countries and 7 non-European 
countries over the period 1990-2009. First, an institutional analysis shows that eligibility conditions, work 
requirements and benefit sanctions vary considerably across countries. Second, relying on new 
indicators, our analysis shows that real benefit levels increased in most countries, whilst the net income 
replacement rates declined on average. This development seems to fit with a ‘making work pay’ agenda. 
A subsequent qualitative analysis of the policies underlying the quantitative measures indicates that the 
declining replacement rates do not result from benefit cuts but from relatively larger wage increases. In 
addition, our policy analysis indicates that work requirements and benefit sanctions have become more 
activating in many countries. Third, the data indicate that social assistance benefits diverged across EU 
and other OECD countries between 1990 and 2009. Finally, this paper seeks to make a methodological 
contribution to the ongoing debate on the ‘dependent variable problem’ in the welfare state literature 
by analysing to what extent changes in quantitative indicators reflect actual policy changes. 
 
Keywords: social assistance benefit replacement rates, welfare state reform, social inclusion, 
convergence, dependent variable problem 
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1. Introduction  
For many people, social assistance benefit schemes are important welfare state programmes. Social 
assistance benefits function as a last-resort safety net, or as the principal instrument for delivering social 
protection (Immervoll, 2009). Furthermore, social assistance benefits are closely connected to other 
welfare state programmes, as the exhaustion of eligibility for other transfers, such as unemployment 
benefits, may lead to the beginning of eligibility for social assistance (Holsch and Kraus, 2006). Especially 
with the return of mass unemployment in Europe and other OECD countries and with the cutbacks in the 
first-tire social insurance, minimum income protection has become more important as a safeguard 
against low income and poverty (Marx and Nelson, 2012). 
However, several developments may affect the adequacy of minimum income protection. Most recently, 
it has been argued by several welfare state scholars that the increased focus on activation and social 
investment policies has put pressure on the adequacy of minimum income protection in many European 
countries (Cantillon, 2011; Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011; Paetzold and Van Vliet, 2014). Stricter 
eligibility conditions would make minimum income benefits less accessible. Moreover, the increased 
focus on activation could lead to crowding-out effects, as higher expenditures on activation programmes 
would put pressure on the budgets for social assistance benefits and other redistributive welfare state 
programmes. Crowding-out effects might also be caused by ageing populations, as increased spending 
on pensions and healthcare might result in smaller budgets for other welfare state programmes, such as 
social assistance benefits. Furthermore, the generosity of social assistance benefits might be affected by 
the pressure stemming from globalisation. Increased international trade and capital mobility trigger 
competition between governments on tax rates and social contributions, leading to smaller budgets for 
welfare state programmes (Swank, 2002; Rodrik, 2011). Given the fact that EU and other OECD countries 
are exposed to comparable developments, converging patterns of social assistance might be expected. 
Another reason why convergence might be expected, at least across EU countries, is the impact of EU-
level initiatives. Most notably, in 2000 the European Council adopted the Lisbon Strategy. As reducing 
poverty and enhancing social inclusion was an important objective of this strategy, it might be expected 
that the Lisbon Strategy has contributed to an upward converging trend of social assistance benefits. 
However, the Lisbon Strategy is based on the open method of co-ordination and earlier studies have 
shown that its impact on national social inclusion policies has been rather limited (Heidenreich and 
Zeitlin, 2009).       
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Despite the importance of social assistance benefits for large groups of people in many countries, little is 
known about the actual developments in social assistance benefits, as only a few studies have analysed 
these developments empirically. Especially in comparison to studies on other welfare state programmes 
such as labour market policies and pension schemes, the welfare state literature pays little attention to 
social assistance. A first comprehensive international comparison of social assistance benefits was 
employed by Eardley et al (1996). These authors provide an extensive qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the developments in social assistance benefits across 22 OECD countries between 1980 and 
1992. During the heydays of the comparative welfare state literature, the second half of the 1990s and 
the early 2000s, not much attention was paid to social assistance. One explanation for this lack of 
attention might be that data on other welfare state programmes, most notably social expenditure data 
provided by the OECD, were relatively easily available, whereas data on social assistance were not. This 
period came to an end in 2006, when Nelson published the first version of the Social Assistance and 
Minimum Income Protection Dataset. More recently, Van Mechelen et al (2011) published the CSB-
Minimum Income Protection Indicators Dataset.    
In this paper, we provide empirical insights into the variation in social assistance and minimum income 
benefit schemes across countries and over time. The study includes 14 Western European countries, 12 
Central and Eastern European countries and 7 non-European OECD countries.2 The inclusion of EU and 
non-EU countries and of Western European and Central and Eastern European countries enables us to 
compare trends across different country groups. Furthermore, the study is focused on the period 1990-
2009, as this is the period for which most data are available. First, we provide a descriptive analysis of 
the institutional characteristics of social assistance schemes, such as benefit levels, eligibility conditions, 
work requirements and benefit sanctions. These characteristics are highly relevant, but often neglected 
in comparative research (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Starke, 2006). 
Second, we focus on the benefit levels. Generally, benefits can be adjusted with three mechanisms (Veit-
Wilson, 1998). The first mechanism is rebasing. In countries where benefit levels are explicitly linked to a 
basket of goods and services, this basket may be re-assessed every few years. With updating, the second 
mechanism, benefit levels are kept in line with a previously specified index, such as price or wage indices. 
                                                          
2 In total, the study includes 26 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom) and 7 other OECD countries (Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States). Greece is not included because it does 
not have a nation-wide safety net (OECD, 2009; Nelson, 2013).   
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Third, governments can deliberately decide to change benefit levels, which is called uprating. Relying on 
data from the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Dataset (Nelson, 2013), we construct 
two indicators, namely real benefit levels and replacement rates. These data have been analysed in 
earlier studies (Nelson, 2008, 2010), but not with these two indicators. The advantage of using the real 
benefit level is that it is relatively easy to interpret, as it is just the annual amount of cash benefits. The 
advantage of the replacement rate is that it is a state-of-the-art welfare state indicator. Hence, with 
replacement rates, social assistance benefits can be compared with other welfare state programmes 
such as unemployment benefits. With respect to Van Mechelen and Marchal’s (2012) study, based on 
the CSB-Minimum Income Protection Indicators Dataset, we extend the analysis to 33 countries and to 
annual data for the period 1990-2009.  
Third, we seek to make a methodological contribution to the ‘dependent variable problem’ debate in the 
comparative welfare state literature on how to conceptualise, operationalise and measure welfare state 
programmes (Clasen and Seigel, 2007; Van Oorschot, 2013). We analyse to what extent changes in 
quantitative indicators reflect changes in social assistance policies. Since measures that are constructed 
for international comparisons are the result of a number of transformations, changes in these measures 
do not necessarily indicate changes in the policy of interest. For instance, a change in the German benefit 
level expressed in dollars may reflect a change in the exchange rate rather than a policy change in 
Germany. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce the institutional 
characteristics of social assistance. Based on these institutional characteristics, we describe the social 
assistance benefit schemes for 33 countries.  Section 3 is focused on the benefit levels. Here, we discuss 
the two indicators to compare social assistance benefits across countries and over time. Using these two 
indicators, the developments in social assistance benefits between 1990 and 2009 are presented in 
section 4. Subsequently, in section 5 we examine to what extent changes in internationally comparable 
measures of benefit levels reflect policy changes. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Institutional characteristics of social assistance 
In addition to the benefit level, other characteristics of social assistance benefit schemes such as 
eligibility conditions and benefit sanctions are important as well. Furthermore, taxes and contributions 
are needed for calculating the net income from social assistance benefits and indexation mechanisms are 
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relevant for the development of benefit levels over time.3 In this section, we describe the variation in 
these institutional characteristics across the 33 countries, based on documentation provided by OECD 
Benefits and Wages (OECD, various years), MISSOC Comparative Tables Dataset (European Commission, 
various years), and the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Dataset (Nelson, 2013). An 
overview of the institutional characteristics of the social assistance benefits for the 33 countries is 
presented in Appendix 1.  
 
Eligibility conditions 
First of all, eligibility conditions determine who and when people have access to welfare state 
programmes. As such, eligibility conditions determine the structure of the welfare state (Korpi and Palme, 
2003). People are eligible for social assistance benefit when they are in need. That is, people can apply 
for the benefits when their income falls below a certain threshold determined by a means-test. An 
additional requirement in most countries is that all other social security programmes have to be 
exhausted. However, there are some countries where social assistance benefits can be paid to 
supplement other benefits or other income sources, e.g. wage and salary, including Cyprus, Finland, 
Hungary, Italy and Japan. In most countries, the provision of the benefits is not subject to a time limit, as 
long as the conditions are satisfied. In some countries, such as Australia or Bulgaria, benefits are initially 
granted for a period of a number of weeks or months. Once the period has expired, claimants can re-
apply for the benefits and the duration of the benefits is de facto unlimited. Second, qualifying 
conditions for social assistance are usually related to nationality, residence and age (Pellizzari, 2006). In 
most countries, nationality requirements are applicable to social assistance benefits, albeit with 
exceptions for refugees or those who have legally lived in the country for a number of years. In addition, 
residence is a requirement in all countries. Furthermore, according to EU directives, EU-citizens are 
eligible for social assistance in all EU countries after three months of residence. However, in many 
countries this is only a theoretical right, as the right of residence is often ended when non-permanent 
residents cannot support themselves financially. With respect to age, working-age people are eligible for 
social assistance, whereas children are generally not. The eligibility age varies across countries between 
18 and 25 years.   
                                                          
3 Another important aspect of social assistance benefit programmes is the coverage rate or take-up rate, since it 
measures the extent to which individuals manage to receive social benefits for which they are actually eligible. 
However, administrative databases may record benefit receipt accurately, but they contain no information on non-
recipients (Matsaganis et al, 2010). Moreover, internationally comparable information on coverage rates of means-
tested benefits is rather scarce. Therefore, it is not included in our analysis.   
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Benefit levels, indexation, taxes and contributions 
The benefit level is usually a function of the household composition and these levels vary considerably 
across countries, as will be shown in the next sections. For the development of the benefit levels over 
time, it is important whether, and if so, when and how indexation is applied (Veit-Wilson, 1998). As 
presented in Appendix 1, in most countries a form of indexation is applied to social assistance benefits. 
However, in countries like Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, and Spain, no automatic indexation 
exists and benefits are adjusted by discrete government decision (European Commission, 2009). In the 
countries where benefits are adjusted automatically, benefit levels are mainly linked to consumer prices. 
This is the case in Australia, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. In other countries such as Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy and Portugal, benefit levels are linked to the developments in pension benefits.  In some 
countries, such as Austria, pension benefits are adjusted to prices, whilst in other countries such as 
Denmark and Germany, the pension benefits, and so the social assistance benefits, are indexed in line 
with wage developments. In Hungary, pension benefits are index to the economic performance (GDP 
growth). In Italy, pensions are partly adjusted in line with the consumer price index and partly in line 
with salary increases. Finally, in Portugal pensions are adjusted according to the developments in GDP 
and the consumer price index. In most countries, adjustments are made once a year, but there are some 
exceptions. In the Netherlands, benefits are adjusted on 1 January and 1 July in accordance with the 
average development of contract-wages. In Lithuania, on the other hand, benefits are adjusted at 
irregular intervals according to governmental decisions based on the consumer price index. In Czech 
Republic, benefits can be indexed sooner in case of extraordinary circumstances.  
Furthermore, the income from social assistance benefits is also determined by the extent to which 
beneficiaries are liable to pay income tax and social contributions (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001; 
Pallage et al, 2013). Most countries do not impose taxes on social assistance benefits. Only in Australia, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands taxes and contributions are levied on social assistance 
benefits. In the Netherlands, however, the income taxes on the social assistance benefits are not paid by 
the recipient, but they are transferred to the tax inspector by the municipality that is administering the 
benefits (OECD, 2009).  
 
Work and activation requirements and benefit sanctions 
In most countries beneficiaries of social assistance who are able bodied are required to prove willingness 
to work, actively seek for work or register at the public employment service. Interestingly, the United 
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Kingdom does not take the work requirements as a prerequisite when granting the benefits Income 
Support (European Commission, 2009).4  In addition, beneficiaries have to participate in training and 
activation programmes as a prerequisite for receiving benefits.  
Work and activation requirements can be enforced through benefit sanctions, which are becoming a 
more and more important instrument in the toolkit of activation measures (Venn, 2012; Eleveld and Van 
Vliet, 2013). In Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Switzerland, there are specific rules stipulating that if a benefit recipient refuses to accept 
a work offer or does not participate in training or other activating programmes, the benefits might be 
reduced partly or entirely. In Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden the obligations of job-
search and work-availability requirements are even extended to the spouse or other family members. 
The benefits might be reduced when the family members do not comply with the obligations (European 
Commission, 2009; OECD, 2009).  
 
3. Benefit levels and replacement rates 
The ‘dependent variable problem’ 
For the comparison of social assistance benefit levels across countries and over time, we use quantitative 
indicators. The question which indicators should be used for international comparative research is an 
important methodological issue in the macro-quantitative welfare state literature (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Clasen and Siegel, 2007). The key issue of this so-called ‘dependent variable problem’ is how to 
conceptualise, operationalise, and measure changes within welfare states. Many empirical studies have 
relied on total social expenditures, total transfer payments, or programmatic expenditures as a share of 
GDP. The most important problem of this type of indicators is that changes in social expenditures do not 
only reflect policy changes, but also changes in the number of beneficiaries. Subsequently, comparative 
studies of welfare state programmes have increasingly turned to the use of social right indicators, such 
as income replacement rates. These studies are mainly focused on international comparative analyses of 
unemployment benefits, sick pay benefits and pension benefits (e.g. Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and 
Scruggs, 2004; Hicks and Freeman, 2009; Van Vliet et al, 2012). Much less attention has been paid to the 
                                                          
4 This might be surprising, given the many years of discussion on adopting elements of workfare in the UK (e.g. 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Such elements have been adopted in the Employment and Support Allowance.       
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international comparative analysis of the generosity of social assistance benefits (Nelson, 2008; Marchal 
et al, 2011). In this study, we use two types of quantitative indicators. First, we utilise the level of 
minimum income benefits. Second, we construct net minimum income benefit replacement rates. 
 
Real net minimum income benefit levels 
The benefit level is a relatively straightforward measure of the generosity of minimum income benefits 
(Olaskoaga et al, 2013). For the benefit level, our study relies on data from the Social Assistance and 
Minimum Income Protection Dataset (Nelson, 2013). This dataset contains annual data on benefit levels 
for a fairly large number of industrialised countries. Following Nelson, we define net minimum income 
benefits as the net income from a benefit package consisting of basic social assistance, child 
supplements, refundable tax credits, and other benefits. One-time social assistance payments to cover 
unexpected and urgent needs or regular supplements to cover exceptional needs are not included in this 
benefit package.  
Another component that could be included in the calculation of the net minimum income benefit 
package is housing benefits. In many countries, housing benefits depend on actual housing costs. As the 
actual housing costs vary strongly across regions within countries, the inclusion of housing benefits in the 
calculated benefit package requires demanding assumptions on the housing costs. Regarding these 
housing costs, three approaches can be found in the literature (Van Mechelen et al, 2011). First, country 
experts can specify a representative rent level. Second, it can be assumed that housing costs equal a 
certain percentage of average earnings. Third, housing costs can be estimated on the basis of the 
average or median rents according to international survey data. These different approaches result in 
different housing costs. For instance, in the CBS-MIPI dataset it is assumed that the rental costs for social 
assistance recipients amount two thirds of the median rental costs paid by households in the respective 
country. For Belgium, this results in a rent of 237 euro (PPP) for 2009. In contrast, in OECD-data housing 
costs are assumed to amount 20 percent of the average wage, resulting in a rent of 596 euro (PPP) for 
Belgium in 2008 (Van Mechelen et al, 2011).  
Consequently, the assumptions regarding the housing costs strongly determine the calculated housing 
benefits and so the calculated net minimum income benefit levels (Eardley et al, 1996). Since we are 
primarily interested in the evolution of social assistance benefits in this study, we do not include housing 
benefits in the benefit package. The consequence of this choice is that our indicators underestimate the 
minimum income, but the advantage is that our indicators give a clearer indication of the developments 
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of social assistance benefits, as they are not affected by developments in housing costs and housing 
benefits.5 An additional advantage of not including housing benefits in the minimum income benefit 
package is that this benefit package is comparable to the benefit package used in studies on 
unemployment benefits. Hence, our minimum income benefit replacement rates, discussed below, are 
comparable to unemployment benefit replacement rates (Scruggs, 2005; Van Vliet and Caminada, 2012). 
In order to compare benefit levels across countries and over time, all benefit levels are expressed in U.S. 
dollars, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and inflation (CPI 2005 = 100). Data on PPPs are taken 
from the Penn World Table (Heston et al, 2012) and for the CPI we rely on data from the World Bank 
(2012). An additional step is required for the Eurozone countries, as the PPPs in the years before the 
introduction of the euro are also expressed in euros, whereas the benefit levels are expressed in the 
national currencies. To convert the national currencies into euros, the study relies on exchange rate data 
from the European Commission (2014).    
 
Net minimum income benefit replacement rates 
As second indicator, we introduce minimum income replacement rates. This measure expresses the 
benefit levels relative to the income from work. As such, replacement rates give an impression of the 
level of social assistance benefits compared to the wages in a country. It should be noted that in most 
cases, minimum income ‘replacement rates’ do not indicate the fraction of the income from work that is 
actually ‘replaced’ by income transfer programmes, as is for instance the case for unemployment benefit 
replacement rates. The reason for this difference is that unemployed workers often receive 
unemployment benefits first before they are entitled to social assistance benefits. Hence, minimum 
income benefit replacement rates and unemployment benefit replacement rates are the same type of 
ratio’s as they share the same denominator, but the meaning of the term ‘replacement rate’ is slightly 
different.     
The net minimum income benefit replacement rate is defined as the ratio of net minimum income 
benefits to the net average production wage. For the net minimum income benefits, we use the benefit 
                                                          
5 To examine the sensitivity of the developments in minimum income benefit package for the inclusion of housing 
benefits, we present net benefit levels including housing benefits in Appendix 2. Here, we use the housing benefits 
provided by the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Dataset (Nelson, 2013). For the calculation of 
these housing benefits, national informants were asked to indicate a gross rent level for a specific type of housing 
in a particular place in their country. The benefit levels that include housing benefits are higher than the benefit 
levels without housing benefits. For all countries but Sweden, the developments between 1990 and 2009 are 
comparable for both types of indicators.                
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levels as described above. The net average production worker wage refers to the in-work wage after 
deducting taxes. For the average production worker wage, we use data from the OECD and Van Vliet and 
Caminada (2012).6     
Although replacement rates can be seen as useful measures to compare social rights across countries 
and over time, they have a number of limitations too, as has been discussed in the welfare state 
literature (Whiteford, 1995; Danforth and Stephens, 2013). Interestingly, some of these limitations do 
not seem to apply to minimum income benefit replacement rates as much as they apply to other social 
security programmes. A first limitation is that it is often difficult to capture the duration of benefit 
programmes with replacement rates. Arguably, this issue is less relevant for social assistance benefits 
than for unemployment benefits, as there is often no maximum duration for social assistance benefits, 
whereas in many countries the duration of unemployment benefits is maximised. Similarly, social 
assistance benefit levels are – in absence of policy reforms - usually constant over time, whereas for 
instance unemployment benefit levels can vary over the unemployment spell of an individual. 
Furthermore, social assistance benefit levels are usually the same for all beneficiaries as they are not 
related to previous earned income, whereas unemployment or disability benefits vary across individuals.  
 
Household types 
Benefit levels and replacement rates can be calculated for different household types. For each country, 
indicators are calculated for three household types: single persons, lone parents with two children and 
households with two parents and two children. 
 
Regional variation within countries 
In most countries, the basic benefit rates are set at the national level. However, in a few countries social 
assistance standards vary slightly across regions. For these countries, the Social Assistance and Minimum 
Income Protection Dataset (Nelson, 2013) deals with this regional variation as follows. For Germany, the 
average of the social assistance benefit levels guaranteed by the provinces is taken. For Sweden (until 
                                                          
6 The OECD has made a fundamental change in the approach of the average wages. The classical approach of 
calculating the average wage was based on the average wage of a production worker (APW), which refers to the 
wage level in the manufacturing industry. The new concept for the average wage refers to the average worker 
wage (AW), which includes much more sectors. The differences in the levels of the APW and the AW can be 
significant for individual countries. The transition from APW to AW started in 2005 and the AW is available from 
2000 onwards. The APW data is available for all years up to 2005 and for the year 2007. Hence, there is no 
consistent time series for the period 1990-2009. In order to have a consistent replacement rate time series, Van 
Vliet and Caminada (2012) estimated the APW for the years 2006, 2008 and 2009 based on the growth rate of the 
AW. 
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1998) and Switzerland, benefit rates are based on national guidelines. For Austria, Canada and Italy, the 
benefit rates refer to the benefit rates of Vienna, Ontario and Milano respectively. The benefit rates in 
Michigan are used for the benefit rates of the United States. For Finland and Japan, the benefit rates 
refer to the benefit rates of the regions with the highest benefit rates. For the countries where social 
assistance standards vary across regions, the indicators presented below give only a limited indication of 
the benefit level.  
 
4. Development of minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates 
Minimum income benefits 
Table 1 presents the developments of the levels of the annual net minimum income benefits over the 
period 1990-2009. The data presented are averages of the benefit levels for the three household types: 
single persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. The data show that 
the minimum income benefit levels vary substantially across countries. The benefit levels in the non-EU 
OECD countries and the Western EU countries are substantially higher than in the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE). Interestingly, between 1990 and 2005 the benefits – expressed in real U.S. 
dollars (CPI 2005 = 100), PPP – are on average higher in the non-EU OECD countries than in the Western 
EU countries. In 2009, the highest benefit levels can be observed in Luxembourg, Japan and Denmark. In 
the group of countries that became EU member states in 2004 and 2007, the highest benefit levels can 
be found in Cyprus and Malta. Among the Central and Eastern European Countries, Slovenia had the 
highest benefit levels. The countries with the lowest benefit levels are Romania and Latvia. Among the 
Western countries, Portugal and the United States have the lowest benefit levels.           
Furthermore, the data show that there is considerable variation over time. In most countries, real 
benefit levels have been increased between 1990 and 2009. That implies that the benefit levels 
increased more than the consumer prices. The countries with the largest increases are Luxembourg and 
Japan. In contrast, there are also several countries which reduced their benefit levels between 1990 and 
2009. In particular, many Central and Eastern European countries had relatively high benefit levels 
during the 1990s and they reduced the benefit levels thereafter. The sharpest decrease took place in 
Hungary between 1990 and 2000, although the benefit levels started to increase in the new millennium 
again. Such a U-turn can be observed in more countries, such as Italy and Sweden.       
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Finally, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation presented in Table 1 give an indication of 
the dispersion of the benefit levels within the country groups. These statistical yardsticks indicate that 
the dispersion of the benefit levels has been increased in both the OECD-7 and the EU-14 between 1990 
and 2009. Interestingly, this suggests that minimum income benefit levels are diverged rather than 
converged over time.  
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Table 1. Real annual minimum income benefit levels (average of three household types), 1990-2009 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
Australia 12,231 13,524 13,870 16,163 16,874 4,643 
Canada 16,311 16,323 13,072 12,851 13,924 -2,387 
Japan 11,174 12,403 13,671 16,659 18,643 7,469 
New Zealand 10,096 9,709 9,736 10,854 11,417 1,321 
Norway 9,250 11,821 13,938 13,507 12,819 3,570 
Switzerland 11,145 11,219 12,654 11,497 11,637 492 
United States 9,623 8,920 7,956 7,805 7,497 -2,126 
       
Mean OECD-7 11,404 11,989 12,128 12,762 13,259 1,855 
Standard deviation 2,395 2,468 2,345 3,086 3,695 1,300 
Coefficient of variation 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.07 
       
Austria 10,545 11,484 11,311 11,601 12,398 1,853 
Belgium 12,452 13,696 12,811 13,261 14,861 2,408 
Denmark 10,806 15,777 16,594 17,955 18,247 7,441 
Finland 13,158 10,698 9,548 10,192 10,263 -2,895 
France 7,195 7,796 8,474 8,721 9,090 1,895 
Germany 9,239 9,767 9,640 11,724 11,998 2,760 
Ireland 11,434 10,889 10,680 12,986 17,680 6,246 
Italy 19,735 11,223 13,096 14,882 17,092 -2,643 
Luxembourg 13,877 20,275 19,422 21,977 27,923 14,047 
Netherlands 14,723 16,572 14,998 14,841 17,179 2,456 
Portugal . 5,226 5,542 6,071 6,787 . 
Spain 16,153 8,870 7,643 7,786 8,134 -8,019 
Sweden 11,081 10,068 8,756 9,468 9,775 -1,306 
United Kingdom 9,006 9,032 10,341 11,413 13,001 3,994 
       
Mean EU-14 . 11,527 11,347 12,349 13,888 . 
Standard deviation . 3,903 3,734 4,171 5,516 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.40 . 
                     
Bulgaria . . . . 3,205 . 
Cyprus . . . 10,270 12,161 . 
Czech Republic 9,160 8,120 6,310 6,967 4,234 -4,925 
Estonia . 3,160 2,145 2,555 2,604 . 
Hungary 15,898 9,188  3,220 2,889 4,399 -11,499 
Latvia . . . 2,036 2,012 . 
Lithuania . . . 2,525 4,639 . 
Malta . . . 10,318 10,264 . 
Poland . 7,650 4,976 4,875 4,818 . 
Romania . . . . 1,353 . 
Slovakia 7,917 5,250 4,285 2,742 3,971 -3,947 
Slovenia . . 8,673 9,142 9,354 . 
       
Mean EU-12 . . . . 5,251 . 
Standard deviation . . . . 3,445 . 
Coefficient of variation . . . . 0.66 . 
Note: Net benefits per year in US dollars, corrected for inflation (2005=100) and PPP; simple average of minimum income 
benefits of three household types: single person, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children.  
Data years are around 1990 (Germany, 1991; Hungary, 1992; Czech Republic, Slovakia, 1993), and around 1995 (Portugal, 
1996). 
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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Benefit levels across different household types 
Turning to Table 2, the net minimum income benefit levels for the three household types show similar 
patterns as the average benefit levels. A first observation is that in all countries single persons receive 
the lowest benefits while two-parents households receive the highest benefits. On this point, Japan is an 
exception, as lone-parent households receive slightly higher benefits than two-parent households. This is 
due to the fact that an extra lone-parent benefit is included when calculating minimum income benefits 
(Nelson, 2013). Another exception is Belgium, where in 2009 the benefits for lone-parents are slightly 
higher than for two-parents households. Second, benefit levels increased on average within the OECD-7 
and the EU-14 for all three household types. Third, in countries where the average benefit levels 
increased (Table 1), the benefit levels increased for all three household types. Similarly, in countries 
where the average benefit levels decreased, the benefit levels decreased for all three household types. 
One exception to this observation is Switzerland, where the benefit levels for single persons and lone 
parents were increased, whereas the benefit levels for two-parents households were slightly decreased.  
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Table 2. Real annual minimum income benefit levels, three household types, 1990-2009 
  Minimum income benefits for single persons  Minimum income benefits for lone parents  Minimum income benefits for two parents 
 
1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
 
1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
 
1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
Australia 7,101 7,528 8,179 1,078  12,477 14,323 18,265 5,789  17,116 19,761 24,176 7,061 
Canada 8,099 6,379 6,099 -2,000  19,136 15,814 17,016 -2,120  21,698 17,023 18,656 -3,042 
Japan 5,344 6,661 8,968 3,625  14,199 17,264 23,726 9,527  13,979 17,089 23,235 9,256 
New Zealand 5,731 5,429 6,078 347  11,545 11,333 13,375 1,830  13,012 12,446 14,799 1,787 
Norway 7,715 10,403 9,936 2,221  8,316 11,509 11,889 3,573  11,718 19,902 16,634 4,915 
Switzerland 6,748 7,589 6,982 235  11,712 14,135 12,990 1,278  14,975 16,240 14,939 -36 
United States 1,776 432 451 -1,324  12,232 10,602 9,754 -2,479  14,861 12,833 12,285 -2,576 
Mean OECD-7 6,073 6,346 6,670 597  12,802 13,568 15,288 2,485  15,337 16,471 17,818 2,481 
Standard deviation 2,138 3,036 3,100 962  3,301 2,504 4,729 1,428  3,274 2,966 4,470 1,196 
Coefficient of variation 0.35 0.48 0.46 0.11  0.26 0.18 0.31 0.05  0.21 0.18 0.25 0.04 
Austria 5,095 5,701 6,255 1,160  11,993 12,767 13,802 1,809  14,546 15,466 17,137 2,590 
Belgium 7,742 8,168 9,391 1,649  14,808 15,133 18,049 3,241  14,808 15,133 17,141 2,334 
Denmark 5,059 8,712 9,762 4,703  11,802 14,694 16,245 4,443  15,556 26,375 28,734 13,177 
Finland 6,149 4,576 4,918 -1,230  14,512 10,433 11,214 -3,298  18,814 13,636 14,657 -4,156 
France 4,481 5,188 5,565 1,084  7,767 9,339 10,018 2,251  9,338 10,895 11,687 2,350 
Germany 4,424 4,532 5,616 1,192  10,498 11,490 13,813 3,315  12,794 12,897 16,566 3,772 
Ireland 6,983 6,702 10,771 3,788  11,355 10,597 17,562 6,208  15,964 14,742 24,707 8,743 
Italy 10,307 6,850 8,909 -1,398  22,213 14,740 19,269 -2,945  26,685 17,697 23,098 -3,587 
Luxembourg 8,617 11,850 16,701 8,084  14,291 20,162 31,447 17,155  18,721 26,254 35,622 16,901 
Netherlands 10,263 10,425 11,719 1,456  16,220 16,539 19,072 2,852  17,687 18,031 20,747 3,060 
Portugal . 2,464 2,944 .  . 5,850 7,250 .  . 8,314 10,168 . 
Spain 11,390 5,304 5,487 -5,902  17,681 8,414 8,922 -8,759  19,390 9,210 9,994 -9,395 
Sweden 5,461 4,415 4,783 -678  12,110 9,476 10,723 -1,387  15,673 12,376 13,820 -1,854 
United Kingdom 4,803 5,055 5,334 531  10,053 11,691 15,396 5,343  12,164 14,275 18,272 6,108 
Mean EU-14 . 6,424 7,725 .  . 12,237 15,199 .  . 15,379 18,739 . 
Standard deviation . 2,570 3,674 .  . 3,726 6,074 .  . 5,403 7,307 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.40 0.48 .  . 0.30 0.40 .  . 0.35 0.39 . 
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Table 2. Continued 
  Minimum income benefits for single persons  Minimum income benefits for lone parents  Minimum income benefits for two parents 
 
1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
 
1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
 
1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
Bulgaria . . 1,196 .  . . 3,852 .  . . 4,567 . 
Cyprus . . 7,021 .  . . 12,945 .  . . 16,518 . 
Czech Republic 4,268 3,006 1,855 -2,413  10,125 7,028 4,592 -5,533  13,086 8,895 6,257 -6,829 
Estonia . 919 1,085 .  . 2,390 3,038 .  . 3,125 3,689 . 
Hungary 6,996 1,690 1,743 -5,253  17,402 3,240 5,829 -11,573  23,296 4,730 5,625 -17,671 
Latvia . . 754 .  . . 2,263 .  . . 3,017 . 
Lithuania . . 1,740 .  . . 5,219 .  . . 6,958 . 
Malta . . 6,879 .  . . 11,637 .  . . 12,276 . 
Poland . 2,828 2,658 .  . 5,147 5,867 .  . 6,952 5,929 . 
Romania . . 522 .  . . 1,606 .  . . 1,930 . 
Slovakia 4,095 2,334 2,123 -1,973  7,371 4,444 3,990 -3,381  12,286 6,076 5,800 -6,486 
Slovenia . 3,106 3,820 .  . 11,071 11,552 .  . 11,843 12,690 . 
Mean EU-12 . . 2,616 .  . . 6,032 .  . . 7,105 . 
Standard deviation . . 2,207 .  . . 3,863 .  . . 4,412 . 
Coefficient of variation . . 0.84 .  . . 0.64 .  . . 0.62 . 
Note:  Net benefits per year in US dollars, corrected for inflation (2005=100) and PPP; three types of households are presented: single persons, lone parents with two children 
and two parents with two children.  
Data years are around 1990 (Germany, 1991; Hungary, 1992; Czech Republic, Slovakia, 1993).  
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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Minimum income replacement rates 
Table 3 presents the developments of the net minimum income replacement rates between 1990 and 
2009. We present averages of the replacement rates for the three household types: single persons, lone 
parents with two children and two parents with two children. As is the case for benefit levels, there is 
considerable variation in replacement rates across countries. The countries with the highest replacement 
rates are Luxembourg, Italy and Denmark. The lowest replacement rates can be found in the United 
States and Estonia. This picture is largely in line with the picture of the benefit levels. However, the 
ranking of the replacement rates does not completely correspond to the ranking of the benefit levels. 
For instance, Portugal and Bulgaria have below-average benefit levels, whilst they have above-level 
replacement rates.   
Between 1990 and 1990, replacement rates decreased in most of the countries. The countries with the 
largest decreases are Czech Republic, Slovakia and Sweden. Compared to these decreases, the increases 
in the countries where the replacement rates increased are small. Only the replacement rate of 
Luxembourg shows a relatively large increase. For a number of countries, the real benefit levels and the 
replacement rates show parallel developments. For example, in Canada, Finland and Spain, both 
indicators declined and in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom both indicators increased. In 
other countries indicators show opposite developments. In Australia, France and the Netherlands for 
instance, real benefit levels increased, whereas replacement rates decreased. Interestingly, this is also 
the case for the average trends of the OECD-7 and the EU-14. Between 1990 and 2009, the real benefit 
levels increased on average, whilst the replacement rates decreased on average. Thus, the minimum 
income benefit levels increased in real terms, but wages increased even more. However, this was not the 
case in the EU-14 between 2005 and 2009, when the replacement rates increased on average. In the 
OECD-7, in contrast, the replacement rate declined on average during these years.   
Finally, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation increased within as well as outside the EU. 
In line with the trends of the benefit levels, these trends indicate that the dispersion of minimum income 
replacement rates has not narrowed over time and that the replacement rates are diverging. This finding 
is in line with the results by Caminada et al (2010), who showed that social assistance benefit 
replacement rates diverged across European countries between 1992 and 2001. However, the diverging 
trend is a remarkable finding, as convergence studies have found converging social protection levels for 
many other welfare state programmes.7  
                                                          
7 It should be noted that patterns of convergence have been found for social expenditures and for replacement 
rates. Less convergence has been found for institutional characteristics of welfare state programmes (Van Vliet, 
2010; Van Vliet, 2011). 
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Table 3. Net minimum income replacement rates (average of three household types), 1990-2009 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
Australia 47.8 47.5 45.7 45.3 40.9 -6.9 
Canada 61.1 60.7 47.7 41.7 42.7 -18.3 
Japan 54.0 55.9 56.4 57.5 59.6 5.6 
New Zealand 50.8 47.4 42.5 43.1 38.0 -12.9 
Norway 39.7 44.5 51.7 45.1 41.9 2.2 
Switzerland 38.7 38.1 41.4 32.9 30.8 -8.0 
United States 35.0 32.4 26.8 24.6 22.5 -12.5 
Mean OECD-7 46.7 46.6 44.6 41.5 39.5 -7.2 
Standard deviation 9.4 9.7 9.4 10.4 11.5 2.1 
Coefficient of variation 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 
       
Austria 43.4 45.1 43.5 43.7 44.4 1.0 
Belgium 47.7 48.6 47.8 46.3 47.3 -0.4 
Denmark 53.2 67.4 67.2 64.6 61.7 8.5 
Finland 58.6 53.4 46.0 41.2 39.0 -19.6 
France 40.6 40.4 40.6 39.1 38.0 -2.5 
Germany 36.6 37.6 33.6 38.3 36.9 0.3 
Ireland 48.4 46.9 39.9 44.4 50.9 2.5 
Italy 57.7 53.8 56.1 62.4 67.1 9.3 
Luxembourg 46.7 60.2 56.9 59.7 72.3 25.5 
Netherlands 59.3 60.8 55.3 48.9 51.7 -7.6 
Portugal . 45.3 49.0 49.9 49.7 . 
Spain 50.9 39.5 34.0 35.0 34.0 -16.9 
Sweden 60.9 58.9 44.4 43.1 38.7 -22.2 
United Kingdom 38.0 39.9 38.5 37.5 41.8 3.8 
       
Mean EU-14 . 49.8 46.6 46.7 48.1 . 
Standard deviation . 9.4 9.6 9.4 11.8 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 . 
       
Bulgaria . . . . 60.7 . 
Cyprus . . . 43.2 39.8 . 
Czech Republic 74.8 70.5 57.1 52.9 25.3 -49.6 
Estonia . 34.8 28.5 25.7 23.9 . 
Hungary 48.1 61.1 34.2 31.8 49.4 1.3 
Latvia . . 
 
33.7 28.3 . 
Lithuania . . 
 
33.5 50.9 . 
Malta . . 
 
52.1 50.1 . 
Poland . 59.6 51.2 47.8 38.1 . 
Romania . . 
 
. 31.7 . 
Slovakia 62.3 53.2 56.8 32.0 31.9 -30.4 
Slovenia . . 50.8 59.9 57.1 . 
       
Mean EU-12 . . . . 40.6 . 
Standard deviation . . . . 12.7 . 
Coefficient of variation . . . . 0.3 . 
Note:  Simple average of minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single persons, lone parents with two 
children and two parents with two children.  
 Data years are around 1990 (Hungary, 1992; Czech Republic, Slovakia, 1993), around 1995 (Portugal, 1996), and around 
2009 (Cyprus, 2007). 
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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Replacement rates across different household types 
In Table 4, the developments of the minimum income replacement rates are shown for the three 
household types. In general, the developments for the three household types are comparable to the 
developments presented in the previous tables. Replacement rates are the highest in the two parents 
households and the lowest for the single persons. Furthermore, in most countries, the three household 
types follow similar developments over time. However, in a number of countries there are interesting 
differences between the household types. In Belgium for instance, the replacement rate for lone parents 
increased, whilst the replacement rates for the other two household types decreased. The Danish 
replacement rates show exactly the opposite pattern. In Norway and the United Kingdom, the 
replacement rates for lone parents and two parents households increased, whilst the replacement rate 
for single persons decreased. Germany shows exactly the opposite pattern.  
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Table 4. Net minimum income replacement rates for the three household types, 1990-2009 
  
Minimum income replacement rates  
for single persons   
Minimum income replacement rates  
for lone parents   
Minimum income replacement rates  
for two parents 
  
1990 2000 2009 change  1990-2009   1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009   1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-
2009 
Australia 30.1 27.2 22.5 -7.6  47.8 46.2 43.2 -4.6  65.5 63.7 57.1 -8.4 
Canada 34.1 26.2 21.1 -12.9  69.9 56.3 51.1 -18.8  79.2 60.6 56.0 -23.2 
Japan 27.4 28.6 30.4 3.1  67.8 70.7 75.0 7.2  66.7 69.9 73.4 6.7 
New Zealand 30.1 24.7 23.6 -6.4  57.6 48.9 42.9 -14.7  64.9 53.7 47.4 -17.5 
Norway 38.9 43.2 35.4 -3.5  33.3 41.0 37.6 4.3  47.0 71.0 52.6 5.7 
Switzerland 26.0 28.0 20.4 -5.6  39.6 44.7 33.4 -6.2  50.6 51.4 38.4 -12.2 
United States 7.0 1.7 1.6 -5.4  44.2 35.7 29.2 -15.0  53.7 43.2 36.8 -16.9 
               Mean OECD-7 27.6 25.6 22.2 -5.5  51.4 49.1 44.6 -6.8  61.1 59.1 51.7 -9.4 
Standard deviation 10.1 12.2 10.6 0.5  14.0 11.5 15.2 1.1  11.2 10.2 12.5 1.3 
Coefficient of variation 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1  0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
 
              
Austria 25.0 26.8 26.6 1.6  47.6 46.9 47.6 0.0  57.7 56.8 59.1 1.4 
Belgium 37.6 38.4 36.6 -1.0  52.8 52.4 54.0 1.2  52.8 52.4 51.3 -1.5 
Denmark 30.2 41.9 37.6 7.4  55.9 57.1 53.3 -2.6  73.6 102.5 94.3 20.7 
Finland 32.0 24.6 20.3 -11.8  62.6 49.1 42.0 -20.6  81.2 64.2 54.9 -26.3 
France 28.9 27.9 26.0 -2.8  42.1 43.3 40.6 -1.5  50.7 50.5 47.4 -3.3 
Germany 20.4 20.7 22.7 2.3  40.6 37.8 40.0 -0.7  48.6 42.4 47.9 -0.7 
Ireland 33.5 28.6 36.5 3.0  46.5 38.1 48.3 1.8  65.3 53.0 68.0 2.7 
Italy 33.3 33.9 39.9 6.5  63.6 61.1 73.4 9.8  76.4 73.4 87.9 11.6 
Luxembourg 36.4 44.3 53.4 17.0  45.0 54.9 76.6 31.6  58.9 71.5 86.8 27.9 
Netherlands 46.4 43.5 39.4 -7.0  62.9 58.6 55.4 -7.5  68.6 63.9 60.3 -8.3 
Portugal . 23.8 23.9 .  . 50.9 52.1 .  . 72.4 73.1 . 
Spain 37.6 25.6 24.7 -13.0  54.9 36.4 36.5 -18.3  60.2 39.9 40.9 -19.2 
Sweden 33.7 24.8 20.8 -12.9  65.0 47.0 41.7 -23.3  84.1 61.4 53.7 -30.4 
United Kingdom 22.4 20.8 19.9 -2.5  41.4 42.7 48.3 6.9  50.1 52.1 57.3 7.2 
 
              
Mean EU-14 . 30.4 30.6 .  . 48.3 50.7 .  . 61.2 63.1 . 
Standard deviation . 8.4 10.0 .  . 8.0 11.8 .  . 15.9 16.6 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.3 0.3 .   . 0.2 0.2 .   . 0.3 0.3 . 
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Table 4. Continued 
  
Minimum income replacement rates  
for single persons   
Minimum income replacement rates  
for lone parents   
Minimum income replacement rates  
for two parents 
  1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009   1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009   1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
Bulgaria . . 26.1 . 
 
. . 71.4 . 
 
. . 84.7 . 
Cyprus . . 24.3 . 
 
. . 41.3 . 
 
. . 52.4 . 
Czech Republic 39.8 32.4 13.8 -25.9 
 
80.6 61.3 26.2 -54.3 
 
104.2 77.6 35.8 -68.4 
Estonia . 13.8 10.9 . 
 
. 31.0 27.4 . 
 
. 40.6 33.3 . 
Hungary 27.8 22.0 23.6 -4.3 
 
49.7 32.7 63.4 13.6 
 
66.6 47.8 61.1 -5.4 
Latvia . . 12.4 . 
 
. . 31.1 . 
 
. . 41.5 . 
Lithuania . . 21.1 . 
 
. . 56.4 . 
 
. . 75.2 . 
Malta . . 37.0 . 
 
. . 55.2 . 
 
. . 58.2 . 
Poland . 31.0 23.0 . 
 
. 52.1 45.4 . 
 
. 70.4 45.9 . 
Romania . . 13.3 . 
 
. . 37.1 . 
 
. . 44.6 . 
Slovakia 37.3 32.2 20.3 -17.1 
 
56.1 58.3 30.8 -25.3 
 
93.5 79.8 44.8 -48.8 
Slovenia . 21.2 26.9 . 
 
. 63.4 68.7 . 
 
. 67.8 75.5 . 
               Mean EU-12 . . 21.1 .
 
. . 46.2 .
 
. . 54.4 .
Standard deviation . . 7.5 . 
 
. . 16.4 . 
 
. . 16.7 . 
Coefficient of variation . . 0.4 .  . . 0.4 .  . . 0.3 . 
Note:   Three types of households are presented: single persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children.  
Data years are around 1990 (Hungary, 1992; Czech Republic, Slovakia, 1993), around 1995 (Portugal, 1996), and around 2009 (Cyprus, 2007). 
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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5. Decomposing the changes in real minimum income benefit levels 
The data presented above show that between 1990 and 2009 minimum income benefits changed in all 
countries included in this study. In this section, we decompose these benefit changes to find the major 
components of these changes. To compare social assistance benefits across countries and over time, real 
net benefit levels are constructed by applying a number of transformations to national social assistance 
benefit levels. More specifically, there are two major types of transformations. First, in addition to social 
assistance benefits, other benefit programmes are included, namely child supplements, refundable tax 
credits, and a category of other benefits. Second, benefit levels are adjusted for a number of financial 
factors, being exchange rates, purchasing power parity (PPP) and inflation (CPI). As a result of these 
transformations, the evolution of the real net benefit levels does not only reflect policy changes in 
national social assistance benefit programmes. Changes in the real benefit levels may also reflect policy 
changes in other components of the national benefit package and they may reflect trends in financial 
factors.     
In the qualitative decomposition analyses, annual changes in the real minimum income benefit levels are 
decomposed into the different steps that are taken to transform the nominal social assistance benefit 
level to the final real minimum income benefit level expressed in U.S. dollars. Subsequently, we have 
studied policy documents to analyse whether changes in the components of the minimum income 
benefit indicator can be related to policy changes. For the qualitative decomposition analysis, we select 
the relatively large annual changes in real minimum income benefit levels, that is, changes larger than 5 
percent.8 The results of this analysis are presented in three parts. The first part is focused on the changes 
in the social assistance benefits (Table 5), the second part is focused on the changes in the child benefits 
(Table 6) and the third part is focused on the developments in the financial factors (Table 7). The grey 
columns of the tables highlight on which component the table is focused on.  
 
  
                                                          
8 We also include a number of cases for which the annual change was slightly smaller than 5 percent and for which 
extensive documentation on the policy changes is available: Australia (1991), Austria (1993, 2006), Denmark (1998), 
Portugal (2006) and the United Kingdom (2003, 2004).     
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Increases in social assistance benefits 
Table 5A presents the decomposition of the increases in the real minimum income benefits. 9 Each 
increase in the minimum income benefit is the result of changes in a number of factors, but the increases 
presented in this table are mainly the result of increases in the social assistance benefit level. For 
instance, the increase in the minimum income benefit level in Cyprus in 2008 mainly reflects a 
substantial increase in the social assistance benefit level. In addition to that, child supplements were also 
increased and the PPP and CPI changed as well. As shown in the table, many increases in the net 
minimum income benefit levels reflect policy changes that increased the social assistance benefit levels 
and these policy changes take different forms. In Austria for instance, the monthly social assistance 
benefit rate was simply increased substantially in 2006. In Belgium, social assistance benefits were linked 
to the standards of living since 2009. In Hungary, social assistance was set at the net level of the 
minimum wage in 2007, which led to a substantial increase of the benefit level.    
 
Decreases in social assistance benefits 
In Table 5B, the major decreases in the minimum income benefits stemming from decreases in the social 
assistance benefits are presented. In Poland for instance, a change in the system in 2001 resulted in 
lower benefit levels and the Czech Republic introduced lower social assistance benefit levels for long-
term inactive citizens in 2007. Clearly, the list of benefit reductions is shorter than the list of benefit 
increases, as the benefit levels increased on average between 1990 and 2009. Interestingly, reductions 
of social assistance benefit levels were usually combined with institutional changes such as more 
stringent eligibility criteria or more incentives to participate in active labour market programmes. For 
example, in Canada more stringent eligibility criteria and administrative controls like fraud prevention 
and detection have become the norm from 1996 onwards. In 2005, the Swiss Conference of Social Action 
Institution (CSIAS) introduced new guidelines to promote better integration into society and the labour 
market. In addition, CSIAS recommended harsher penalties for the abuse of social assistance benefits. 
Finally, although social assistance benefits are usually not bound to a maximum duration, there can be a 
maximum duration of complementary programmes. In the United States for instance, able bodied single 
person households are only eligible for Food Stamps for a three months period.  
                                                          
9 Two components of the benefit package, refundable tax credits and other benefits, are not included in the tables 
of the decomposition analyses, because they only apply to Canada and the United Kingdom. Moreover, these 
components do not explain much of the changes in minimum income benefit schemes for these countries. 
23 
 
Table 5. Changes in real minimum income benefits stemming from changes in social assistance benefits, 1990-2009 
Table 5A. Real minimum income benefit increases  
Country Year Minimum 
income 
benefits 
Social 
assistance 
Child 
Supplements 
Euro
/LCU 
PPP CPI Policy change: social assistance Source 
Australia 1991 + + + / - + In July 1991, two new forms of support were introduced: Job Search Allowance and 
Newstart Allowance. Payment rates of social assistance (Special Benefit) were at the 
discretion of the Secretary of the Department of Family and Community Services but 
could not exceed the maximum Newstart Allowance.  
Saunders, 
1995; OECD, 
2001.  
Austria 1992 + + 0 - + + n.a. n.a. 
 1993 + + + - + + The burden on social assistance paid by the provinces was eased with the introduction 
of the Federal Nursing Benefits Act.  
Eardley et al, 
1996.  
 2006 + + 0 0 - + Eligibility conditions and benefit rates vary across provinces; rules are not executed 
uniformly; it depends heavily on the discretion of social welfare agencies. In Austria 
benefit rates reflect those in Vienna. In 2006, the monthly social assistance benefit 
rate in Vienna increased substantially, especially for couples. 
OECD, 2006; 
Nelson, 2013. 
Belgium 2009 +  + + 0 - - Since 2009 every two years the government sets an amount of resources that can be 
spend to adjust benefits to welfare evolution. However there is no statutory 
mechanism that determines which social benefits will be increased and by how much. 
This is decided through collective agreement. 
Van 
Mechelen 
and Marchal, 
2012.  
Bulgaria 2009 + + coded as zero / 0 + The amount of the guaranteed minimum income (GMI) is determined by an Act of the 
Council of Ministers. The GMI was increased from 55 to 65 BGN in 2009. 
OECD, 2009. 
Canada 2006 + (lone- 
and two- 
parents) 
+ + / - + For Canada, Ontario social assistance rates are used. Ontario sets its own rules and 
benefit rates. As of July 2006, a new Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) provides 
families CAD 100 per month for each child younger than 6 years of age. The Canada 
Child Tax Benefit supplement for children age 0 to 6 years is eliminated. However, a 
grandfather clause ensures that the CCTB supplement remains in place until 30 June 
2007 for parents with a child who turns age 6 before that date.  
OECD, 2005; 
2006. 
Cyprus 2008 
2009 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
On 1 July 2008, public assistance for basic needs was increased by 12% and on 1 July 
2009 it was further increased by 6.34%.  
European 
Commission, 
2014. 
Czech 
Republic 
2001 + + coded as zero / + + In 2001, Czech Republic set a new and freezing nominal level of the basic cash-welfare 
benefit (minimum living standard, MLS). This level was frozen. 
European 
Commission, 
2014.  
Denmark 1994 + + + / - + From January 1994, benefits became taxable and benefit recipients had to pay  
insurance contributions, but the benefit levels were increased substantially. In 
addition, social assistance recipients got access to the normal rent subsidies and child 
care subsidies.  
Eardley et al, 
1996. 
 1998 + (two 
parents) 
+ + / + + In the spring of 1998, personal income taxes were lowered, but mainly for low-income 
groups.  
Green-
Pedersen et 
al, 2001. 
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Table 5A. Continued 
Country Year Minimum 
income 
benefits 
Social 
assistance 
Child 
Supplements 
Euro
/LCU 
PPP CPI Policy change: social assistance Source 
Estonia 2005 + + coded as zero / + + There is no automatic indexation. The guaranteed minimum income benefit amounts were 
increased in 2005. 
OECD, 
2005. 
 2007 + + coded as zero / + + The basic benefit amount for single persons was increased from EEK 750 to EEK 900 per 
month. Equivalence scales are used for following household members. 
OECD, 
2007 
 2009 + + coded as zero / - - n.a. n.a. 
Germany 2005 + + 0 0 - + As a result of the Hartz IV reforms, unemployment assistance and social assistance for persons 
who are able to work were combined into one benefit, the basic jobseekers allowance, since 
2005. In an effort to provide the recipients of the jobseekers allowance with additional 
incentives to work, on 3 June 2005 (effective on 1 October 2005), the Bundestag adopted a 
Law Reforming Free Amounts (Freibetragsneuregelungsgesetz), which seeks to further 
improve their possibilities to earn an extra income. It stipulates that recipients of jobseekers 
allowance may keep a larger part of their above subsistence level income. 
OECD, 
2005. 
Hungary 2006 + + + / + + After 1 July 2006, the system of regular social assistance benefits was transformed into a so-
called family-centered benefit, which is calculated with the help of ‘consumption unit’, 
reflecting the structure of the family. Instead of a fixed amount, the benefit will depend on the 
income of the family. The income of the family will be supplemented to 90 % of the minimum 
old-age pension per consumption unit.  
OECD, 
2006. 
 2007 + + + / + + Since 1 January 2007, the maximum amount of social assistance is set at the minimum wage. 
Universal family benefits were raised differentially, strengthening the focus on child poverty 
reduction. The benefit was raised in every family-type by 4.5%, but in the case of the family 
types with the highest poverty risk (families with three or more children, and single parent 
families) the raise was 6.1-7.9%.  
European 
Commissi
on, 2014. 
Ireland 1997 + + + - + + The National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) was initiated in 1997. It involves a wide-ranging set 
of measures which are combined into one programme in order to combat poverty and to 
promote social inclusion.   
Daly and 
Yeates, 
2003. 
 2003 + + + 0 + + n.a. n.a. 
 2005 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
Since 2005, a direct payment of EUR 1000 per year is available for all parents regardless of 
their labour status, for each child under 6. 
OECD, 
2004. 
 2006 + + + 0 - + Benefit reform on family-related benefits: The upper income limit for the One-parent family 
was increased by 28% to EUR 375 a week. Earnings (gross) of less than EUR 146.5 (from June 
2006) are excluded from assessment of means, with claimants entitled to full rate of payment. 
50% of earnings between EUR 146.5 and EUR 375 per week are assessed as means and a 
reduced rate of One-Parent Family Payment is payable.  
European 
Commissi
on, 2014. 
 2007
, 
2008 
+ + + 0 - + Increasing the upper income limit for the One-Parent Family Payment by 6.7% to EUR 400 per 
week. Earnings (gross) of less than EUR 146.5 per week are excluded from assessments of 
means, entitling claimants to the full benefits. From May 2007, earnings between EUR 146.5 
and EUR 400 per week are counted for 50% in means assessments.  
European 
Commissi
on, 2014. 
Italy 1999 + + coded as zero - 0 + n.a.  n.a. 
25 
 
Table 5A. Continued 
Country Year Minimum 
income 
benefits 
Social 
assistance 
Child 
Supplements 
Euro/LCU PPP CPI Policy change: social assistance Source 
Latvia 2009 + + coded as zero / - + 1. From 1 October 2009 Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) level is 
increased.  (The GMI level is set LVL 40 per month for adult and LVL 45 per 
month for children under 18); The local municipalities are eligible to 
determine the level of GMI for persons, receiving old-age pension or 
disability pension, but not below LVL 40 and not above LVL 90 per month. 
There is no maximum amount of GMI benefits per household since 1 
October 2009. 
2. From 1 December 2009, the set of state social benefits which are not 
considered as income when measuring resources of clients for granting 
municipal GMI benefits is reduced. 
OECD, 2009. 
Lithuania 2006 + + coded as zero / + + There was a policy reform that included a number of aspects of the social 
assistance benefit scheme (o.a. access for more people); benefit levels 
were increased. 
European 
Commission, 
2014. 
 2007, 
2008 
+ + coded as zero / + + n.a. n.a. 
 2009 + + coded as zero / - + People with incomes lower than the State Supported Income are entitled 
to social assistance. Since 2009, child benefits are no longer included in the 
income. As a result, social assistance benefits may be higher.  
OECD, 2009. 
Luxembourg 1993 + + + - + + In February 1993, social assistance benefit rates for single adults were 
increased by 3.8% and the rate for the second adult in the household was 
also increased.  
Eardley et al, 
1996.  
 1995 + + + - 0 + n.a. n.a. 
 2009 + + 0 0 + + The heating supplement was abolished and replaced by a new social 
assistance benefit that was tax free. 
Nelson, 
2013. 
Malta 2005 + + 0 + 0 + In an effort to encourage more women to enter the labour market, the 
government introduced a tax rebate scheme for women returners. Those 
who returned to work benefited from a tax rebate of a maximum of LM 
700. The amount could be availed of over a period of two years. 
OECD, 2005. 
Netherlands 1995 + + + - 0 + In 1995, the New Public Assistance Act allowed municipalities to exercise 
more discretion in setting benefit levels. Municipal officials can 
supplement the basic allowance by as much as twenty percent, or reduced 
it by as much as fifteen percent to encourage beneficiaries to seek work.  
Cox, 1998.  
Norway 1994 + + coded as zero / - + n.a.  n.a. 
 1995-
1997, 
1999 
+ + coded as zero / + + n.a. n.a. 
Poland 1998 + (lone- 
and two- 
parents) 
+ coded as zero / + + n.a. n.a. 
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Table 5A. Continued  
Country Year Minimum 
income 
benefits 
Social 
assistance 
Child 
Supplements 
Euro/LCU PPP CPI Policy change: social assistance Source 
Portugal 2004 + + + 0 - + In 2003, the Minimum Guaranteed Income was replaced by the Social 
Insertion Income. The basic characteristics remained the same, but the 
benefits were increased for larger households. Moreover, activation 
measures became stricter.  
European 
Commission, 
2014. 
 2005 + + + 0 0 + n.a.  n.a. 
 2006 + + + 0 0  Regulations concerning the income for Social Inclusion: Eligibility criteria 
take into account household income of the last month (or three months 
average if variable), instead of 12 month.  
European 
Commission, 
2014.  
Slovakia 2007 + + 0 - - + Benefits were increased by SKK 350 per month (SKK 370 per month since 1 
September 2007), when the person, jointly assessed with the citizen in 
material need, is a pregnant woman. The benefit for persons in material 
need with a child under 1 year old was increased by SKK 350 per month 
(SKK 370 per month since 1 September 2007). 
OECD, 2007. 
 2009 + + 0 0 - + The benefit amount for pregnant women was increased by EUR 13.50 per 
month.  
OECD, 2009. 
Slovenia 2002 + + + + + + With the amendments of the Social assistance and Services Act introduced 
in 2001, social assistance was substantially increased and provisions were 
enhanced in a way that responsibilities and obligations are incumbent on 
the persons applying for and receiving social assistance.   
European 
Commission, 
2013. 
Spain 2009 + + 0 0 - - The minimum income benefit amount was increased to EUR 404.42 per 
month. 
OECD, 2009 
Sweden 2005 + + coded as zero / - + Rise in the ceiling of the income base (from 7.5 to 10 price base amounts), 
which is applied to calculate income-based benefits during e.g. sickness 
and parenthood. Rise in the basic parental benefit (lowest level) from SEK 
60 to SEK 180 per day.  
European 
Commission, 
2014.  
Switzerland 1998 + + coded as zero / - + n.a. n.a. 
  + + coded as zero / - + n.a. n.a. 
United 
Kingdom 
2000 + + coded as zero / - + The Working Family Tax Credit and Income Support rates for all children 
under 11 years old were raised by around Pound 6 per week in real terms 
in order to delete the difference with rates for those aged 11-16. 
Gregg et al, 
2006 
  2002 + + coded as zero / 0 + Working Family Tax Credit and Income Support were increased in line with 
prices.  
Gregg et al, 
2006 
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 Table 5B. Real minimum income benefit decreases 
Country Year Minimum 
income 
benefits 
Social 
assistance 
Child 
Supplements 
Euro
/LCU 
PPP CPI Policy change: social assistance  Source 
Canada 1995 - - 0 / - + The February 1995 budget announced the cancellation of the Canada Assistance 
Plan (CAP) and it was abolished before implementing the Ontario Works 
programme in 1996.  
Gabel et al, 
2004. 
 1996 - - 0 / 0 + The Canadian welfare system has undergone some fundamental changes since 
1996. In almost every province and territory, more stringent eligibility criteria and 
administrative controls became the norm, and benefit reductions affecting part or 
all of the caseloads were not uncommon. 
OECD, 2001. 
Czech 
Republic 
2007 - - coded as zero / - + Since 2007, housing benefits are not included in social assistance but paid in 
addition to social assistance and therefore not included in our calculation.  
Nelson, 2013. 
Malta 2007 - - 0 0 0 + n.a. n.a. 
New 
Zealand 
1991 - - 0 / - + A number of Social Security Benefits were reduced effective from 1 April 1991. 
Universal Family Benefit was abolished effective from 1 April 1991.  
New Zealand 
Ministry of Social 
Development, 
2014.  
Norway 1998 - - coded as zero / + + n.a. n.a. 
Poland  2001 - (two 
parents) 
- (two parents) coded as zero / + + The benefit system was changed in 2001. There was a maximum benefit amount 
placed on social assistance, resulting in reductions for lone-parent and two-parent 
families. 
Nelson, 2013. 
Slovakia 2003 - - Coded as zero + + + Since 1 January 2003, social assistance benefit levels were lowered. Furthermore, a 
maximum level on social assistance benefits was introduced.  
OECD, 2003. 
 2004 - - (lone- and 
two-parents) 
+ - + + On 1 January 2004 a new social assistance act (No. 599/2003) came into force. In 
addition to regular social assistance, low income households could now receive 
child benefits, health care allowance, protective allowance, and activation 
allowance. Basic social assistance benefits were decreased and the health care 
allowance, protective allowance and activation allowance are not included in the 
data.  
OECD, 2003, 
2004; Nelson, 
2013. 
Sweden 1997 - - coded as zero / + + n.a.  n.a. 
Switzerla
nd 
2005 - - coded as zero / - + In 2005, the Swiss Conference of Social Action Institution (CSIAS) set new guidelines 
to introduce more incentives for better integration into society and the labour 
market.  
OECD, 2005. 
United 
States 
1999 -  - (single 
persons) 
coded as zero / 0 + Since the late 1990s, able bodied single households are only eligible for Food 
Stamps for a three months period.   
Nelson, 2013. 
Note: Minimum income benefits consist of basic social assistance, child supplements, other benefits and refundable tax credits, adjusted by the exchange rate of Euro/LCU 
where applicable, Purchasing power parity (PPP) and Consumer Price Index (CPI). ‘+’ indicates that the factor increased during the year. ‘-’ indicates that the factor 
decreased during the year. ‘0’ indicates that there was no change in this component during the year. ‘coded as zero’ indicates that child supplements have a value of zero 
in this country. ‘/’ indicates that the factor exchange rate Euro/LCU is not applicable (e.g., non-EU countries) ‘n.a.’ refers to ‘no information available’. The grey-marked 
columns indicate the factors that contributed the most to the change of the real minimum income benefits. This factor is described in the column ‘policy change’. 
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Changes in child supplements 
From Table 5 we can see that in most countries child supplements increased a bit or remained the same 
in years when we observe large changes in real minimum income benefits, but that the changes in the 
social assistance benefits are predominantly responsible for the changes in minimum income benefits. 
However, there are some cases where the changes in child supplements are actually the main driver for 
changes in the benefit package. These cases are presented in Table 6. For example, in 2004, the weekly 
child benefit rate in the United Kingdom was GBP 16.50 for the eldest child and GBP 11.05 for each other 
child. In 2005, the benefit rate decreased to GBP 16.05 for the eldest child and to GBP 10.75 for each 
other child, resulting in a substantial decrease in minimum income benefits in 2005. Other cases of 
changes in the child supplements that led to substantial increases in the minimum income benefits are 
Australia (1997, 2001, 2004), Japan (2004), Malta (2008), the Netherlands (2008), New Zealand (2005, 
2007), Slovakia (2008) and the United Kingdom (2003, 2004, 2006).  
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Table 6. Changes in real minimum income benefits stemming from changes in child supplements, 1990-2009 
Country Year Minimum 
income 
benefits 
Social 
assistance 
Child 
Supplements 
Euro
/LCU 
PPP CPI Policy change: child supplements Source 
Australia 1997 + + + / 0 + A new government, formed by a coalition of the Liberal and National Parties, 
focused more on families and increased child care expenditures significantly since 
then.   
 
Bernnan, 
2007. 
 
 2001 + + + / 0 + 1. In July 2000, a new structure and delivery of family benefits called Family Tax 
Benefits (FTB) was introduced. Ten types of assistance were merged into two types: 
Maternity Allowances (FTB Part A) and Double Orphan Pension (FTB Part B).  
2. In July 2000, Child Care Benefit (CCB) replaced the previous Child Care Assistance 
and Child Care Rebate. 
OECD, 2001; 
Nelson, 
2013. 
 2004 + + + / - + 1. FTB(A) Supplement Payment, provided an extra AUD 600 per child to FTB(A) 
recipients, increased to AUD 613.20 in 2004-2005. It provides extra assistance to 
help with the cost of children and is paid at the end of the financial year. 
2. A change to taper rates for FTB(A) and FTB(B). The first (or lower) FTB(A) taper 
rate was reduced from 30 per cent to 20 per cent. The FTB(B) taper rate was also 
reduced from 30 per cent to 20 per cent. This allows families to keep more of their 
FTB as their earnings or other private income increases. 
3. Increase in the FTB(B) income threshold from AUD 1,825 to AUD 4,000 per 
annum, so that a secondary earner in a couple can earn more before their FTB(B) 
starts to be withdrawn. 
4. Commencing from 1 July 2005 parents returning to work after caring for a child at 
home will have their FTB(B), up to the point where they return to work, 
quarantined from the FTB reconciliation process. 
5. From 1 July 2005 FTB(B) maximum rates will increase by AUD 300 per annum. 
(This increase was brought forward to 1 January 2005 and payable as a supplement 
from 1 July 2005). 
OECD, 2004. 
Japan 2004 + - + / - - There is a child benefits added to minimum income benefits in SaMip. The benefit is 
paid for a child yet to pass through third-grade age of elementary school. Since April 
2004, the maximum age for family-related benefits was raised to 9 years old. 
OECD, 2004; 
Nelson, 
2013 
Malta 2008 + (lone- 
and two- 
parents) 
+ + 0 0 + 1. As from 2008, the disabled child allowance is no longer means tested and the 
rate is of EUR 16.31 per week. In 2008, a number of means-tested benefits were 
revised to standard rates applicable to all beneficiaries. 
2. During 2008, the government introduced a deduction from income tax for 
children attending private kindergartens. The maximum deduction is EUR 1,000 per 
year.  
OECD, 2008. 
Netherlands 2008 + + + 0 - + An additional child benefit was introduced in 2008. The child benefit, which 
replaces the former child tax credit, does not depend on the family size. A family 
can only claim this benefit when having children under the age of 18 years old, for 
which they also receive the tax free and income independent child benefit. The 
benefit has a maximum value of EUR 994 per year. The benefit is withdrawn at a 
rate of 5.75 per cent when the family’s yearly taxable income exceeds EUR 29,413 
and is completely withdrawn when taxable income is at least EUR 46,700. 
OECD, 2008. 
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Table 6. Continued 
Country Year Minimum 
income 
benefits 
Social assistance Child 
Supplements 
Euro
/LCU 
PPP CPI Policy change: child supplements Source 
New 
Zealand 
2005 + + (single persons 
and lone 
parents 
+ / - + 1. From 1 April 2005, Family Support rates were increased by NZD 25 per week for the 
first child and NZD 15 for subsequent children. Foster Care Allowance, Unsupported 
Child’s Benefit and Orphans Benefit were increased by NZD 15 per week; The child 
component of some main benefit rates were moved into family support regime; The 
number of Accommodation Supplement areas were increased from three to four (with 
several locations being moved in areas with higher maximum rates), and the 
maximum rates in some areas increased; Family Support Tax Credit was included as 
income for Special Benefits for the first time. 
2. From 3 October 2005, the Childcare Assistance rates were increased by a further 
10%. 
3. From May 2005, applicants for a benefit were able to choose to have their income 
assessed over either the prior 26 or 52 weeks, for the purposes of determining the 
length of the stand-down period to apply before their first benefit payment. 
OECD, 2005. 
 2007 + + + / - + There are several policy changes in 2006 and 2007. Reform related to social assistance 
and other associated benefits: From 24 September 2007 all benefits payable to a sole 
parent can continue for 8 weeks after the beneficiary stops caring for the child 
because of a change in circumstances beyond their control. 
OECD, 2007. 
Slovakia 2008 + + + - 0 - The law on parental leave allowances (280/2002) was replaced by a law on childcare 
benefits (561/2009). Childcare benefits are provided to working or studying parents 
until the child reaches the age of three, to cover childcare costs.  
European 
Commission, 
2014. 
United 
Kingdom 
2003 + -(lone- and two- 
parents) 
+ / 0 + Child Tax credit was introduced in April 2003 and replaced former child allowance and 
child-related support.   
OECD, 2003 
 2004 + + (single persons 
and lone 
parents) 
+ / - + In the United Kingdom, low income households may receive a Council Tax Benefit 
which is part of social assistance. In 2004, Council Tax Benefit was backdated for up to 
12 months.   
European 
Commission, 
2014. 
 2005 - + - / 0 + In 2004, weekly child benefit rate is GBP 16.5 for the eldest child whom benefit is 
payable and GBP 11.05 for each other child. In 2005, the benefit rate decreased to 
GBP 16.05 for the eldest child and GBP 10.75 for each other child.  
OECD, 2005. 
 2006 + (lone- 
and two- 
parents) 
+ + / 0 + From April 2005 Child Tax Credit (CTC) also replaced the child-related elements of 
Income Support, Minimum Income Guarantee, and income-based Jobseeker's 
Allowance. Families on these benefits that have not already claimed CTC were 
migrated to CTC from October 2005. 
OECD, 2006. 
Note: Minimum income benefits consist of basic social assistance, child supplements, other benefits and refundable tax credits, adjusted by the exchange rate of Euro/LCU 
where applicable, Purchasing power parity (PPP) and Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
 ‘+’ indicates that the factor increased during the year. 
  ‘-’ indicates that the factor decreased during the year. 
‘0’ indicates that there was no change in this component during the year.   
‘coded as zero’ indicates that child supplements have a value of zero in this country.  
 ‘/’ indicates that the factor exchange rate Euro/LCU is not applicable (e.g., non-EU countries).  
The grey-marked columns indicate the factors that contributed the most to the change of the real minimum income benefits.  
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Changes in financial factors 
Finally, Table 7 presents the changes in the minimum income benefit levels that are mainly stemming 
from changes in the financial factors. Exchanges rates, PPP and CPI are used to adjust benefit levels in 
order to construct measures that are comparable across countries and over time. Interestingly, the 
financial factors led to increases in the benefit level in only three cases: Finland 1994, 1995 and Ireland 
2009. In all other cases, changes in the financial factors contributed to decreases of minimum income 
benefits in real terms. Even in cases where the nominal social assistance benefit level increased, such as 
Australia (2000) and Austria (1996), larger increases in the exchange rate, PPP, or CPI led to decreases in 
the real minimum income benefits. Furthermore, when we combine the insights from Tables 5, 6 and 7, 
it appears that the majority of the drops in the real minimum income benefits are the result of adjusting 
the benefit levels with exchange rates, PPP and CPI. Cuts in nominal social assistance benefits are 
relatively rare.   
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Table 7. Changes in real minimum income benefits stemming from changes in financial factors 
Country Year Minimum income 
benefits 
Social assistance Child Supplements Euro/
LCU 
PPP CPI 
Australia 2000 - + - / + + 
Bulgaria 2008 - + (lone- and two-parents) Coded as zero / + + 
Cyprus 2007 - 0 + + 0 + 
Czech 
Republic 
1994, 1996, 
1998 
- + Coded as zero / + + 
 2000 - 0 Coded as zero / + + 
 2008 - 0 Coded as zero / - + 
Denmark 2008 - 0 - (lone parents), 0 
(two parents) 
/ - + 
Estonia 1996 - + Coded as zero / + + 
 1998 - + Coded as zero / + + 
 1999-2001 - 0 Coded as zero / + + 
Finland 1991 - 0 Coded as zero + + + 
 1992 - + Coded as zero + 0 + 
 1993 - + Coded as zero + + + 
 1994 + + Coded as zero - - + 
 1995 + - (lone- and two- patents) Coded as zero - - + 
Hungary 1994-1995, 
2000-2002 
- + 0 / + + 
 1996-1999 - + + / + + 
 2008 - -(single persons) + / + + 
 2009 - 0 0 / + + 
Ireland 1993 - + (two parents) 0 + + + 
 1998 - + + + + + 
 2009 + + -(two parents) 0 - - 
Italy 1992-1995 - + Coded as zero + + + 
Latvia 2007 - + Coded as zero / + + 
 2008 - 0 Coded as zero / + + 
Netherlands 1997 - + + + 0 + 
 1998 - + (single persons and lone 
parents) 
+ + + + 
Poland 1996,1997, 
1999, 2000 
- 0 Coded as zero / + + 
Romania 2008 - + + / + + 
Slovakia 1994 - 0 Coded as zero + + + 
 1995, 1999 - + Coded as zero + + + 
Slovenia 1993-2001, 
2003-2004 
- + + + + + 
 2000 - - (lone- and two-parents) + + + + 
Spain 1991 - 0 0 - + + 
 1992-1995, 
1997 
- 0 0 + + + 
Sweden 1991 - + (single persons and two 
parents) 
Coded as zero / + + 
 1993 - + Coded as zero / + + 
United States 1991 - (lone- and two- 
parents) 
+ (single persons and two 
parents) 
Coded as zero / 0 + 
Note: Minimum income benefits consist of basic social assistance, child supplements, other benefits and refundable tax credits, adjusted by the 
exchange rate of Euro/LCU where applicable, Purchasing power parity (PPP) and Consumer Price Index (CPI). ‘+’ indicates that the factor 
increased during the year. ‘-’ indicates that the factor decreased during the year. ‘0’ indicates that there was no change in this component 
during the year. ‘coded as zero’ indicates that child supplements have a value of zero in this country. ‘/’ indicates that the factor exchange rate 
Euro/LCU is not applicable (e.g., non-EU countries).’n.a.’ refers to ‘no information available’. The grey-marked columns indicate the factors that 
contributed the most to the change of the real minimum income benefits. This factor is described in the column ‘policy change’.  
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6. Summary and discussion 
Compared to welfare state programmes such as unemployment benefits or pensions, little attention has 
been paid to internationally comparative research on social assistance in the welfare state literature. The 
limited attention for social assistance is remarkable given its function of last-resort safety net in most 
European and other OECD welfare states. As such, social assistance fulfills an import function in 
combating poverty and pursuing social inclusion. As a result of the limited attention for social assistance, 
little is known about the variation in these benefit schemes across countries and about how these 
benefit schemes have evolved over time. This paper explores the developments of social assistance and 
minimum income benefits across 14 Western European countries, 12 Central and Eastern European 
countries and 7 non-European countries over the period 1990-2009. For this, we construct two 
indicators, namely real minimum income benefit levels and minimum income replacement rates.   
A first result of this study is that the data show that the real benefit levels increased in most countries 
between 1990 and 2009. The institutional analysis revealed that in most countries benefit levels are 
indexed to consumer prices, but the data show that the benefit levels increased actually more than the 
consumer prices. Indeed, a decomposition of the benefit levels increases learns that most of the 
increases reflect deliberate policy changes of either social assistance benefit schemes or complementary 
policies such as child supplements.     
A second result of this study is that there is considerable variation in minimum income replacement 
rates and in the developments of replacement rates over time, but that in most countries replacement 
rates decreased between 1990 and 2009. Taken together with the trends in benefit levels, these results 
indicate that net social assistance benefits increased in real terms, but that the increases in benefit levels 
did not keep up with the wage developments. Such a widening gap between social assistance benefits 
and average wages might increase inequality between the lowest and the average income groups.  
However, no large retrenchments, reforms or benefit cuts have taken place across EU and other OECD 
countries. This is an interesting observation, given the major reforms and retrenchments in other welfare 
state programmes such as unemployment benefits and disability benefits over the past decades. This 
lack of major reforms might be an explanation for the limited attention for social assistance benefits in 
the welfare state literature. Instead of major reforms, the decreasing replacement rates in many 
countries suggest that policy-making in the case of social assistance can be characterised as a politics of 
non-intervention (Van Mechelen and Marchal, 2012). Even though substantial benefit cuts are absent, 
not keeping the benefits in line with the wage developments is also a policy decision. Such policy 
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decisions would be in line with a ‘making work pay’ agenda, aimed at increasing employment levels. In 
addition to these decreasing replacement rates, our policy analysis indicates that other characteristics of 
social assistance benefit schemes such as work requirements and benefit sanctions have become more 
activating too.  
Third, we analyse to what extent social assistance benefits converged across the countries. For both the 
real benefit levels and the replacement rates, the data indicate that social assistance benefits did not 
converge between 1990 and 2009. The variation across countries actually increased over time, indicating 
that social assistance benefit levels diverged instead. This divergent trend is in line with earlier divergent 
trends in social assistance benefits (Caminada et al, 2010). Nevertheless, it is a remarkable result against 
the backdrop of the existing convergence studies, which found convergent trends for most quantitative 
welfare state indicators (Van Vliet, 2011). However, further convergence analyses are needed, as it might 
be possible that underlying patterns of convergence become visible once conditional factors are taken 
into account. 
From a methodological viewpoint, this paper also aims to make a contribution to the debate on the 
‘dependent variable problem’. That is, we analyse to what extent changes in quantitative indicators 
reflect actual policy changes. A decomposition of the annual changes in real benefit levels indicates that 
most of these changes reflect policy changes. More specifically, most of the increases in real benefit 
levels can be linked directly to policy changes that stipulate increases in social assistance benefit levels or 
child supplements. Decreases in the real minimum income benefits, in contrast, are the result of changes 
in indicators that are used to construct internationally comparable indicators, such as the CPI, PPP or the 
exchange rate. However, given the increasing trend between 1990 and 2009, most of the annual benefit 
changes that we have analysed are increases. Hence, the overall conclusion from the decomposition 
analysis seems to be that changes in real minimum income benefit levels give a fairly good indication of 
policy changes.     
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Appendix 1. Social assistance policies in the 33 countries, 2009 
 Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria Canada 
Name Special Benefit Sozialhilfe Revenu d'intégration Месечнасоциалнапомощ Ontario Works 
1.1. Benefit duration Benefits are granted every 13 weeks 
and can be renewed thereafter. 
Unlimited, as long as the social administration 
considers the household to be eligible. 
Unlimited. Unlimited. Entitlement is restored 12 
months after expiring the 12 months 
period. 
Unlimited, as long as there is a 
need. Province of British Columbia: 
a cumulative 24 months out of 
every 60 months. 
1.2. Nationality n.a. Nationality required with exceptions. Nationals, stateless persons with 
residence permit, refugees and 
persons of a foreign nationality 
registered at the population office, EU 
citizens with a residence permit of 
more than 3 months. 
No nationality requirements. n.a. 
1.3. Residence n.a. Residence in Austria. Residing effectively in the country. Bulgarian citizens with permanent 
residence; foreigners with a permanent 
residence permit;  
foreigners granted asylum,  
refugee or humanitarian status. 
n.a. 
1.4. Age n.a. No age requirements. With effect from 18 years of age, with 
three exceptions: minors 
emancipated by marriage, single 
persons looking after (a) child(ren) 
and pregnant minors. 
No age requirements. Who has not reached the age of 
majority may not receive social 
assistance in his or her own right 
except in cases of family 
breakdown, abuse, or parenthood. 
1.5. Work requirements Recipients capable of work are 
expected to look for work and to accept 
offers of suitable employment. 
Persons capable of work must be willing to perform 
reasonable work. Exceptions: with respect to age 
(men over the age of 65 and women over the age of 
60), with respect to care obligations or current 
training (studies excepted). 
Prove willingness to work; unless 
impossible for equity or health 
reasons. 
Registered in the Employment Office 
Directorates for at least 9 months 
before the submission of the claim and 
not rejected any jobs offered or 
qualification courses organised by the 
Employment Offices. With exceptions. 
Actively encouraged to pursue, 
accept, and retain any reasonable 
offer of employment or retraining. 
1.6. Exhaustion of other claims n.a. Entitlements to other social benefits and 
maintenance payments must be exhausted. 
Benefits are granted only after the 
exhaustion of social rights (pensions, 
unemployment benefits, disability 
benefits, family allowances) in all 
other social systems. 
Social allowances are granted to 
persons who have exhausted all 
possibilities for self-support. 
n.a. 
2. Indexation Maximum rates are indexed in March 
and September each year to reflect 
increases in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). 
Annual adjustments are in principle linked to the 
increases of pension benefits. Pensions are annually 
adjusted to consumer prices (Van Mechelen and 
Marchal, 2012).   
Automatic readjustment of 2% of the 
allowance occurs when the Consumer 
Price Index changes by 2% relative to 
the previous pivot index. The King can 
increase the basic amounts based on 
the living standard.  
Benefits are adjusted by Governmental 
Decree according to the available 
resources. 
n.a. 
3. Taxation of benefits Taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. 
4. Contributions n.a. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. 
5. Sanctions n.a. n.a. In case of voluntary omission or 
material error, the benefit might be 
recovered.  
The benefits are withdrawn when the 
unemployed have refused to participate 
in programmes organised by the 
municipal administration for providing 
social services, ecological programmes 
for urbanisation and hygienic work in 
the populated areas where the duration 
of the employment is not shorter than 5 
days.  
Should a recipient choose not to 
pursue employment or retraining, 
he/she may be subject to penalties 
ranging from a specified reduction 
in benefits over a prescribed period 
of time to the full cancellation of 
benefits. 
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 Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland 
Name Δημόσιο Βοήθημα Dávky pomoci v hmotné nouzi Kontanthjælp Toimetulekutoetus Living Allowance 
1.1. Benefit duration Unlimited, as long as the recipient is 
in need of assistance. 
Unlimited, as long as the conditions are fulfilled. Unlimited. Unlimited. Benefits are granted 
and renewed on a monthly basis. 
Unlimited. 
1.2. Nationality No nationality requirements, except 
for the third country nationals 
without permanent residence or long-
term residence.  
No nationality requirements. Benefits of more than 6 months paid only 
to Danish nationals, persons enjoying the 
same status as Danish nationals, or foreign 
citizens living in Denmark since more than 
7 years. 
No nationality requirements. No nationality requirements. 
1.3. Residence All residents legally residing in Cyprus.  Permanent residents, persons  
who obtained asylum, migrant workers and their 
family members , EU citizens after 3 month of 
residence in the Czech Republic. 
Residence in Denmark during 7 of the last 
8 years.  
Permanent residents. All persons residing in the country. 
1.4. Age No age limits. Except from the case of 
children with disabilities, in practice, 
ΔημόσιοΒοήθημα is seldom given 
directly to children under 18 years of 
age. 
No age requirements. No age requirements. In practice, 
however, assistance is seldom given to 
children under 18 years of age because 
they are supported by their parents. 
No age requirements. No age requirements. In practice, 
however, social assistance is seldom 
given individually to children under 
18 years of age because parents are 
obliged to support their children.  
1.5. Work requirements Taking into account personal and 
family circumstances, healthy persons 
of working age are expected to seek 
‘all work’ or accept a training offer 
that will lead to employment. 
Willingness to work is a subject of assessment. 
Certain persons are excluded from this testing 
due to age or health status (65+, pensioners, 
disabled, parents taking care of small children, 
careers of care-dependent person, dependent 
children and persons who are temporary sick).  
Everybody is bound to support 
themselves; both spouses must have 
exhausted all possibilities of finding 
employment. 
Beneficiaries with no other problem than 
the unemployment must actively look for 
a job. 
Work requirements for people 
capable of working and aged 
between 18 and pensionable age.  
Everybody is bound to support him- 
or herself first, and must try to get a 
job with a sufficient salary at all 
times, as long as he/she is able to 
work. 
1.6. Exhaustion of other claims ΔημόσιοΒοήθημα is a claim of last 
resort and is subsidiary to other 
claims. 
Last resort system. All sources of income, 
including social security benefits, are taken into 
account, and are exhausted.  
Obligation to claim in priority benefits to 
which one may be entitled in the 
framework of other schemes. 
Obligation to support spouse and children 
under 18 years of age. 
All sources of income must be 
exhausted. 
Social assistance is complementary to 
all other subsistence allowances and 
is provided as a last resort (safety 
net). 
2. Indexation The basis of adjustment is the 
consumer price index. Adjustment is 
made on an annual basis. 
The government is authorised to increase the 
amounts regularly (on 1 January every year) if 
the growth of consumer price index for 
sustenance and personal needs exceeds 5%. 
In case of extraordinary circumstances the 
amounts can be indexed sooner.  
Adjustment once a year according to the 
adjustment rate 
(satsreguleringsprocenten). This 
adjustment rate for social pensions is set 
once a year, based on wage developments 
(Abrahamson and Wehner, 2003).  
The coping line is established by 
the Parliament. No automatic 
indexation. 
Adjustment once a year in 
accordance with the index of national 
pensions (Kansaneläke). Pension 
benefits are annually adjusted based 
on the cost-of-living. 
3. Taxation of benefits Not taxable. Not taxable. Taxable.  Not taxable. Not taxable. 
4. Contributions No contributions.  No contributions. Contributions to the supplementary 
pension scheme. 
No contributions. No contributions. 
5. Sanctions In case the applicant refuses to 
undertake training and find a job that 
would allow him/her to increase his 
income, assistance is not granted. 
Recipients who do not collaborate e.g. in job 
search receive lower benefits. 
If the beneficiary or his/her partner (who 
has no other problem than 
unemployment), working in the 
framework of an activation measure, stays 
away from his/her working place without 
any justified reason, the benefit is reduced 
in proportion to the hours and days of 
absence.  
If a spouse refuses to satisfy the 
conditions to be available for the labour 
market/activation, none of the spouses 
can get social assistance.  
The local municipality may refuse 
to grant the benefit to those 
capable of work and aged 
between 18 and pensionable age, 
who are neither working nor 
studying and have repeatedly 
refused, without due cause, offers 
of suitable work or participation in 
rehabilitation or education 
programmes arranged by the local 
municipality. 
The amount of social assistance may 
be reduced by 20 per cent if a person 
refuses to accept a work offer or does 
not participate in training or certain 
other activating measures. If refusal 
is recurrent social assistance may be 
reduced by 40 per cent. 
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 France Germany Hungary Ireland Italy Japan 
Name Revenu de Solidarité Active Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende/Hilfe 
zum Lebensunterhalt 
Regular social support 
(Rendszeres Szociális Segely) 
Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance. 
Minimo Vitale Public Assistance 
1.1. Benefit 
duration 
Unlimited. Benefits are granted for consecutive 
periods of three months. 
Unlimited, until circumstances no longer 
require it. 
Unlimited.  Unlimited. Limited, with possibility of 
renewal depending on duration 
of the situation of need. 
Unlimited. If conditions 
are fulfilled after the end 
of the benefit period, 
he/she can re-apply. 
1.2. Nationality Nationals or foreigners in possession for at least 5 
years of a residence permit authorising them to 
work. Exception for refugees, stateless persons and 
holders of the residence card. 
Nationals; citizens of the signatory 
countries to the Social Security 
agreement (e.g. most of the EU Member 
States), persons granted political asylum; 
other foreigners (with restrictions).  
n.a.. No nationality requirements. Nationals, foreign residents and 
political refugees. 
n.a 
1.3. Residence Stable and actual residence in France. Reside in the country. 
Germans normally residing abroad may 
be granted social assistance in certain 
exceptional emergency cases, i.e. one of 
three conditions mentioned in the Act 
must be fulfilled. 
n.a.  Must be habitually resident in 
the State (except for a person 
with the status of a 'worker' 
within the meaning of EU 
legislation and for once-off 
exceptional and urgent needs 
payments). 
Residence in the regional or 
municipal territory (according to 
the authority administering the 
service). 
n.a. 
1.4. Age As of 25 years of age; or under 25 when having to 
support at least one child, even if not yet born. 
No age requirements; minors can claim in 
their own right.  
Active age (18-62 years) Normally paid from 18 years of 
age. 
No age limit; apart from the 
Region of Campania concerning 
cash benefits for minor orphans, 
administered by the 
municipalities. 
n.a. 
1.5. Work 
requirements 
Obligation to look for work or to take the necessary 
steps to create one’s own activity or improve one’s 
integration into the labour market. 
Where entitled persons can be 
reasonably expected to do a job despite 
their restricted capacity, the assistance 
also includes the offer of a job, the 
preparation and the guidance of the 
entitled person. If entitled persons can be 
expected to take up a reasonable job, 
they are obliged to do so and to take part 
in the necessary preparations.  
Availability support: 
Cooperate with the Public 
Employment Service and to 
take part in public work for at 
least 90 days per year. Young 
people under 35 who have 
not completed the 8th class of 
the primary school have to 
attend training. Regular social 
allowance: Cooperate with 
the designated body in order 
to remain entitled to the 
benefit.  
Jobseekers will normally be 
entitled to a jobseeker’s 
payment as distinct from a 
supplementary welfare 
allowance. 
The beneficiary must be willing 
to pursue his/her autonomy and 
to engage in activities which 
improve his/her situation. With 
this intention the municipalities 
or the regions organise special 
professional courses in certain 
cases. 
n.a. 
1.6. Exhaustion of 
other claims 
Applicants must vindicate their rights to social 
benefits, to alimony claims and to maintenance 
payments. 
Claims on other social benefits and 
relating to persons obliged to pay 
maintenance have to be exhausted. 
Exceptions: e.g. parental allowance up to 
EUR 300, basic pensions according to the 
War Pensioners Act . 
Beneficiaries can receive 
other social benefits or 
incomes (e.g. heating 
supplement, seasonal 
supplement) at the same 
time, but are no longer 
entitled to income 
supplements for the 
unemployed. 
Claims to other benefits must 
normally be exhausted; 
however, if a state of need still 
exists with those benefits, the 
allowance may also be paid in 
full or in part. An allowance may 
also be made on an interim 
basis pending processing of 
other benefits claims. 
Generally speaking the receipt of 
other social assistance benefits 
does not cause the minimum 
subsistence benefit to be 
suspended. 
No interaction. Can be 
used to complement 
unemployment benefits. 
2. Indexation Reviewed once a year according to the evolution of 
consumer prices, tobacco excluded. 
Adjustment of standard rates (Regelsätze) 
on 1 July each year corresponding to the 
changes of the current pension value in 
statutory pension insurance. Pensions are  
adjusted based on  wage developments .   
Annual adjustment is in 
principle linked to the 
pensions, while pensions are 
indexed to the economic 
performance (GDP growth). 
Adjusted once each year but 
there is no statutory 
adjustment basis (Van 
Mechelen and Marchal, 2012). 
Yearly adjusted, depending on 
pension increases (adjusted to 
consumer price index and salary 
increases).  
n.a. 
3. Taxation of 
benefits 
Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. 
4. Contributions No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. 
5. Sanctions The beneficiary cannot refuse more than two 
reasonable job offers as defined in the personalised 
work access plan or in the contract signed with the 
organisation responsible for his/her support. 
No specific sanctions nationwide. Entitled 
persons are obliged to take a reasonable 
job and to take part in the necessary 
preparations. 
n.a. Supplementary Welfare 
Allowances are not commonly 
paid to the unemployed. 
n.a. n.a. 
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 Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands New Zealand 
Name Pabalsts Garantētā Minimālā 
Ienākuma Līmeņa Nodrošināšanai 
Socialinė pašalpa Revenu Minimum Garanti. GhajnunaSocjali Wet Werk en Bijstand (WWB)  Jobseeker Support 
1.1. Benefit 
duration 
Unlimited. Benefits are granted 
every 3 months and renewable 
after that. From 1 April 2010, 
benefits are granted every 6 
months. 
Unlimited. Benefits are granted every 
3 months and renewable after that.  
Unlimited. Benefits stop or do 
not renew when gross income 
exceeds 130% of guaranteed 
minimum income.  
Unlimited. Unlimited, as long as there is a need. Unlimited.  
1.2. Nationality No nationality requirements. No nationality requirements. No nationality requirements. Nationality required. All persons legally residing in the 
Netherlands with inadequate financial 
resources to meet their essential living costs. 
n.a. 
1.3. Residence Residence in administrative 
territory of respective local 
authority. 
Permanent residents. Persons resident in 
Luxembourg and having 
resided in the country for at 
least 5 years during the last 
20 years. Exceptions for EU, 
EEA or Swiss citizens, refugees 
and stateless persons. 
Permanent residents. All persons legally residing in the 
Netherlands with inadequate financial 
resources to meet their essential living costs. 
Resided in New Zealand continuously for at 
least 2 years. 
1.4. Age No age requirements. No age requirements. As of 25 years; exceptions for 
persons unable to work, those 
who are raising a child or 
looking after a disabled 
person. 
From 18 to 60 years. As from 18 years. For people aged 18-21, the 
benefit level is related to the child benefit 
level. 
 
  
At least 18 years or alternatively be at least 
16 years old and married, in a civil union or 
de facto relationship, with one or more 
dependent children. 
1.5. Work 
requirements 
Unemployed beneficiaries capable 
of work are obliged to register at 
the State Employment Service, 
seek work and accept suitable 
offers of work. 
Persons of working age who are 
without a job must be registered at 
the local office of Lithuanian Labour 
Exchange and should be willing to 
work, train or retrain. 
To be ready to participate in 
active measures. 
Recipients are obliged to seek 
suitable work. 
People must do as much as possible to 
support themselves: apply for jobs, accept 
jobs that do not directly fit training or 
experience, cooperate with offered support 
such as training. For people aged 18-27, 
municipalities can apply special activation 
programmes.  
The person must be available for and 
actively seeking full-time work. The 
beneficiary must comply with the work test, 
which includes acceptance of any offer of 
suitable employment.   
1.6. Exhaustion 
of other claims 
All other resources must have 
been exhausted (social security 
benefits as well as maintenance 
based on the civil responsibilities 
of private citizens such as ex-
spouses, parents etc.). Social 
security benefits are taken into 
account as source of claimant’s 
income.  
Family income is taken into account 
when calculating social benefits, 
except for: child benefits, social grants 
and assistance in cash paid pursuant to 
the Law on Social Services, as well as 
income related to work relations of 
pupils who study at general education 
schools and vocational institutions 
according to the general education or 
vocational training curricula.  
Exhaustion of other claims is 
the requirement to assert 
one's rights to social benefits 
and to maintain claims. 
Other Social Security benefits 
may be combined such as 
Unemployment Benefits and 
Special Unemployment 
Benefits but Special 
Unemployment Benefits may 
only be awarded after 
satisfying capital assets and 
income means tests. 
Social assistance is supplementary to all 
other subsistence allowances and is 
provided as a last resort (safety net). If a 
person receives alimony (social benefits, 
income from work), then it is topped up to 
the relevant assistance level. 
Can be supplementary to other benefits like 
Family refundable tax credits.  
2. Indexation The Cabinet of Ministers adjusts 
the amount according to the 
possibilities of annual budget. 
Benefits adjusted at irregular intervals 
according to governmental decision 
based upon price index. 
Automatic indexation 
according to the evolution of 
consumer prices when the 
index varies by 2.5% in 
relation to the figure 
triggering the previous 
adjustment; until 2009 fixed 
adjustments. 
Benefits are adjusted annually 
by the government through 
the budget and are linked to 
the minimum wage. 
Adjustment on 1 January and 1 July in 
accordance with the average development 
of contract-wages. 
Benefits are adjusted annually on 1 April, 
according to changes in the consumer price 
index for the previous calendar year.  
3. Taxation of 
benefits 
Not taxable. Not taxable. Taxable. Not taxable. Taxable. Taxable.  
4.Contributions No contributions. No contributions. Contributions for health care 
and long-term care insurance. 
No contributions. Social insurance contributions.  n.a. 
5. Sanctions Refusal of participation duties will 
lead to a reduction of the 
guaranteed minimum income 
benefit (proportionally to the 
number of adults who refused to 
fulfill the requirements). 
Refusal of job, training, public duties 
or work supported by the Employment 
Fund may lead to the suspension or 
refusal of granting benefits. 
Benefits might be reduced or 
suspended when beneficiaries 
have willingly abandoned or 
reduced work without valid 
justification or have been 
dismissed for serious reasons. 
Social assistance is given until 
the head of household stops 
registering for work with the 
public employment office. 
When obligations in terms of work 
requirements are not fulfilled, the 
municipality may reduce or stop the 
allowance.  
The benefit may be withheld for up to 13 
weeks in case of voluntary unemployment 
or the failure to meet employment-related 
obligations. The benefit is not paid if 
unemployment was voluntary or due to 
dismissal for serious misconduct or 
involvement in an industrial dispute. 
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Appendix 1. Continued 
 Norway Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
Name Økonomisk stønad Zasilek Okresowy Rendimento social de inserção Ajutor Social Dávka v hmotnejnúdzi DenarnaSocialnaPomoč 
1.1. Benefit duration Unlimited. Recipients can re-apply for 
benefits once the period has expired.  
Permanent benefit: unlimited. 
Temporary benefit: benefit 
duration fixed according to the 
beneficiary situation and after 
the case examination. 
Renewed automatically after 12 
months of duration. From 2010, a 
reassessment is made during the 
month of renewal. 
Unlimited, as long as the 
conditions are met. 
Payment to the citizen on 
the basis of lawful decision 
and during the period in 
which the entitlement  
conditions last. 
Does not exceed 3 months for the 
first time or 6 months if 
circumstances remained unchanged. 
Maximum 12 months in special cases. 
Permanent for those whose social 
status is unlikely to improve. 
1.2. Nationality No nationality requirements. No nationality requirements. No nationality requirements. No nationality condition. No nationality 
requirements. 
No nationality requirements. 
1.3. Residence All persons legally resident in the 
country. 
Permanent residents. Legal place of residency in Portugal. Permanent or temporary 
residence in Romania. Family 
members must live together. 
All residents. Permanent residence. 
1.4. Age No age condition. In practice, however, 
allowance is seldom given individually 
to children under 18 years of age. 
From 18 years. 18 years of age or older, or less than 
18 years of age if the person has 
minor child dependants, or is married 
or living in cohabitation or in the case 
of pregnancy. 
Individual: Minimum 18 years 
of age. 
No age requirements. Single persons aged over 18 years, 
who are neither married nor 
cohabiting and have no children.  
1.5. Work requirements Each person who claims social financial 
assistance is obliged to support him-
/herself by work if work is available 
and the person in question is able to 
work. 
All those capable of work must 
be available for work, training 
or socio-professional 
integration and be registered 
with the labour office, except 
for persons entitled to a 
Permanent Allowance for the 
care of a handicapped child. 
Availability for employment, as well as 
occupational training and integration 
activities. 
Required solely to the family 
member or individual meeting 
the following conditions: 
Age between 16 years and 
retirement age, working 
capacity, lack of wage or other 
income, and not attending a 
form of education. 
Able bodied applicants of 
working age must be willing 
to accept offers of suitable 
work, training or practice 
small community services 
or voluntary work and be 
registered at the Office of 
Labour, Social Affairs and 
Family in order to receive 
higher benefits. 
In principle everyone is obliged to 
support him- or herself through 
work. Entitlement maybe linked to 
signing a contract with the Social 
Work Centre which places obligations 
on the beneficiary to resolve his/her 
social problems (rehabilitation, 
health treatment, etc.). 
1.6. Exhaustion of other 
claims 
Social financial assistance is 
complementary to all other 
subsistence allowances and is provided 
as a last resort assistance (safety net). 
Other claims for benefits must 
be exhausted. 
No condition, can be combined with 
other social security benefits. 
No condition. Other statutory benefits 
and non-financial kinds of 
help must be exhausted. 
Entitlements to other social 
insurance benefits and maintenance 
payments from other people must be 
exhausted. 
2. Indexation Governmental guidelines are 
periodically adjusted in accordance 
with the rise in consumer prices.  
Linked to the consumer prices 
index and adjusted once a 
year. 
Annual indexation in line with the 
social pension amount from the non-
contributory scheme. Pensions are 
adjusted to developments in the GDP 
and the consumer price index.  
Annually adjusted, according 
to the development of the 
consumer price index, by 
government decisions. 
Annual adjustment taking 
into account the increases 
in the net income (or in the 
costs of living of lower-
income households). A 
further adjustment can be 
made on 1 September.  
Adjustments are made once a year in 
January with respect to the price 
index for basic necessities in the 
period from January to December of 
the previous year compared to the 
year before. 
3. Taxation of benefits Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. 
4. Contributions No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. No contributions. 
5. Sanctions The consequences of not complying 
with the conditions are not regulated 
by law. In principle, the benefit is to be 
withdrawn, partially or completely. 
Recovery possible in cases of 
administrative, fraud, failure to 
inform of a change of 
circumstances.  
If an adult household member does 
not comply with the labour insertion 
programme, that person will be 
excluded from the household 
composition for determining the 
‘household adult equivalent 
dimension’, but all income or earnings 
received by that family member will 
still be considered for the means test. 
In exchange for the social 
assistance payments, one of 
the family members/lone 
persons must perform a 
certain number of working 
hours in the benefit of the 
municipality. 
Recipients have the 
obligation to return a 
benefit which they are not 
entitled. The obligation to 
return the benefit plus a 
10% increase shall exist for 
3 years from the day of 
verification by the state (or 
municipality) for a 
maximum of 10 years from 
the day of receiving the 
benefit.  
Social assistance must be returned 
with interest if obtained by giving 
false information or failing to report a 
change in circumstances. Social 
assistance may also be recuperated 
from the estate of a deceased 
beneficiary.   
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Appendix 1. Continued 
 Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
Name Ingreso Minimo/Renta Mínima 
de Inserción 
Ekonomisktbistånd Aide Sociale Income Support Food Stamps/Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
1.1. Benefit duration Generally 12 months; possibility 
of extension in certain cases. 
Unlimited, until circumstances no 
longer require support. 
Unlimited, as long as the need is 
demonstrated. 
Unlimited, as long as the conditions are 
fulfilled. 
Unlimited, as long as the conditions are fulfilled. 
1.2. Nationality Not necessarily a condition for 
entitlement. 
No nationality requirements. n.a. No nationality requirement. Claimants 
who have lived outside the UK for 2 years 
before the date of claim must satisfy the 
habitual residence test. 
n.a. 
1.3. Residence Resident of the Autonomous 
Community for a certain period 
(usually between 3 and 5 
years). 
All persons with the right to stay in 
the country. 
n.a. Must be present in the country. n.a. 
1.4. Age Generally up to 65 years of age. 
Special rules for disabled 
people. 
Assistance is given to the family as a 
whole, as long as parents are 
obliged to support their children. No 
other conditions. 
n.a. From 16 years of age if conditions of 
entitlement are satisfied. 
n.a. 
1.5. Work requirements Must be capable of working. Everybody is bound to support him- 
or herself first, and must try to get a 
job with a sufficient salary at all 
times, as long as he/she is able to 
work. 
Engage in gainful employment or 
enhance an existing one. 
Not a condition for Income Support.  Able-bodied adults without children are eligible 
for only 3 months of benefits in a 36-month 
period, unless they met a work requirement (work 
20 hours or more per week, or participated in a 
qualifying work activity) or lived in an area with 
high unemployment.  
1.6. Exhaustion of other 
claims 
Accumulation with other public 
social benefits not allowed. 
Social assistance is complementary 
to all other subsistence allowances. 
Claimant has to claim all 
government financed allowances 
before coming to the municipal 
assistance.   
No condition, but all income from gainful 
activity is normally taken into account in 
the calculation of the benefits.  
Claims to other benefits must be 
exhausted but if need still exists, Income 
Support can be paid to bring income up 
to a set limit. An interim payment may be 
made, pending the outcome of claims to 
other benefits. 
n.a. 
2. Indexation Generally adjusted yearly by 
provisions of the Autonomous 
Community and the 
Autonomous Cities of Ceuta 
and Melilla, linked to the 
economic situation. 
Social assistance consists of several 
components. For some items the 
Government and Parliament decide 
the amount yearly. For other items 
the municipalities ought to pay the 
real costs if they are reasonable. 
Benefits have been adjusted to inflation 
in 2003. 
Adjustment normally once a year with 
reference to movements in prices. 
n.a. 
3. Taxation of benefits Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. Not taxable. 
4. Contributions No contributions. No contributions. n.a. No contributions. No contributions. 
5. Sanctions In cases of error, fraud, failure 
to inform of a change of 
circumstances the benefits 
might be recovered.  
n.a. Assistance benefits may be reduced if 
the recipient refuses to cooperate or 
does not show enough integration 
efforts.   
n.a. n.a. 
 
Note: ‘n.a.’ refers to ‘no information available’. 
Source: Abrahamson and Wehner, 2003; Benefits and Wages: Country specific information (OECD, 2009), MISSOC Comparative Tables Dataset (European Commission, 2009), 
Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSA, 2014), and The Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Data Set (Nelson, 2013).   
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Appendix 2A. Real annual minimum income benefit levels including housing benefits (average of three 
household types), 1990-2009 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 change  1990-2009 
Australia 13,844 15,548 16,054 18,369 19,122 5,278 
Canada 16,311 16,323 13,072 12,851 13,924 -2,387 
Japan 12,148 13,367 14,697 22,827 25,547 13,398 
New Zealand 12,079 12,329 12,768 13,729 14,156 2,077 
Norway 17,429 20,266 21,992 22,265 21,275 3,846 
Switzerland 19,629 20,590 22,211 22,244 23,530 3,901 
United States 9,623 8,920 7,956 7,805 7,497 -2,126 
       
Mean OECD-7 14,438 15,335 15,536 17,156 17,864 3,427 
Standard deviation 3,506 4,223 5,138 5,821 6,339 2,833 
Coefficient of variation 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.11 
       
Austria 13,749 15,061 15,543 15,954 16,629 2,879 
Belgium 12,452 13,696 12,811 13,261 14,861 2,408 
Denmark 17,396 19,757 20,757 20,777 21,161 3,765 
Finland 19,671 16,942 15,869 17,207 18,178 -1,493 
France 9,228 9,980 10,864 11,181 11,654 2,426 
Germany 15,445 17,338 17,506 19,989 20,704 5,260 
Ireland 16,811 15,406 14,279 16,257 24,107 7,296 
Italy 19,735 11,223 13,096 14,882 17,092 -2,643 
Luxembourg 16,202 22,392 21,273 35,258 29,493 13,291 
Netherlands 16,063 18,196 16,874 16,858 19,379 3,315 
Portugal . 5,226 5,542 6,071 6,787 . 
Spain 16,153 8,870 7,643 7,786 8,134 -8,019 
Sweden 17,147 16,451 14,820 15,977 17,280 132 
United Kingdom 11,672 12,074 13,730 15,066 16,755 5,083 
       
Mean EU-14 . 14,472 14,329 16,180 17,301 . 
Standard deviation . 4,624 4,370 6,852 5,947 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.32 0.30 0.42 0.34 . 
       
Bulgaria . . . . 3,205 . 
Cyprus . . . 14,901 17,731 . 
Czech Republic 9,160 8,120 6,310 6,967 7,145 -2,015 
Estonia . 4,659 3,162 3,766 3,630 . 
Hungary 17,645 9,729 3,363 3,115 4,569 -13,076 
Latvia . . . 3,514 3,460 . 
Lithuania . . . 3,483 5,729 . 
Malta . . . 11,804 11,609 . 
Poland . 7,650 4,976 4,875 4,818 . 
Romania . . . . 1,353 . 
Slovakia 7,917 5,250 5,729 3,501 5,245 -2,672 
Slovenia . 24,509 10,203 11,011 11,014 . 
       
Mean EU-12 . . . . 6,626 . 
Standard deviation . . . . 4,636 . 
Coefficient of variation . . . . 0.70 . 
Note: Net benefits per year in US dollars, corrected for inflation (2005=100) and PPP; simple average of minimum income 
benefits of three household types: single person, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children.  
Data years are around 1990 (Germany, 1991; Hungary, 1992; Czech Republic, Slovakia, 1993), and around 1995 (Portugal, 
1996). 
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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Table 2B. Real annual minimum income benefit levels including housing benefits, three household types, 1990-2009 
  Minimum income benefits for single persons   Minimum income benefits for lone parents   Minimum income benefits for two parents 
 1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009  1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009  1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
Australia 8,524 9,492 10,203 1,679  14,184 16,616 20,626 6,441  18,823 22,055 26,537 7,713 
Canada 8,099 6,379 6,099 -2,000  19,136 15,814 17,016 -2,120  21,698 17,023 18,656 -3,042 
Japan 6,318 7,688 14,722 8,404  15,173 18,290 31,204 16,031  14,953 18,115 30,714 15,760 
New Zealand 7,627 7,959 8,701 1,075  13,504 14,473 16,062 2,558  15,107 15,873 17,706 2,599 
Norway 14,231 16,819 16,671 2,441  16,113 19,185 19,949 3,837  21,944 29,970 27,204 5,260 
Switzerland 12,124 13,645 14,512 2,388  20,752 24,319 25,665 4,913  26,012 28,670 30,413 4,401 
United States 1,776 432 451 -1,324  12,232 10,602 9,754 -2,479  14,861 12,833 12,285 -2,576 
               
Mean OECD-7 8,385 8,916 10,194 1,809  15,871 17,043 20,039 4,169  19,057 20,648 23,359 4,302 
Standard deviation 4,016 5,260 5,701 1,685  3,075 4,260 6,921 3,847  4,355 6,540 7,135 2,780 
Coefficient of variation 0.48 0.59 0.56 0.08  0.19 0.25 0.35 0.15  0.23 0.32 0.31 0.08 
               
Austria 8,299 9,812 10,348 2,049  15,198 17,059 18,102 2,904  17,751 19,759 21,436 3,685 
Belgium 7,742 8,168 9,391 1,649  14,808 15,133 18,049 3,241  14,808 15,133 17,141 2,334 
Denmark 10,282 11,339 11,269 987  18,141 18,592 20,469 2,328  23,766 32,339 31,745 7,979 
Finland 11,551 9,819 11,484 -66  21,225 16,948 19,372 -1,853  26,236 20,840 23,677 -2,559 
France 6,319 7,315 7,847 1,529  9,787 11,766 12,623 2,836  11,579 13,510 14,493 2,914 
Germany 9,359 10,788 12,535 3,176  16,573 19,193 22,345 5,772  20,402 22,536 27,233 6,832 
Ireland 10,740 9,172 15,200 4,460  17,109 14,460 24,463 7,355  22,584 19,205 32,658 10,074 
Italy 10,307 6,850 8,909 -1,398  22,213 14,740 19,269 -2,945  26,685 17,697 23,098 -3,587 
Luxembourg 10,943 13,702 18,270 7,327  16,617 22,013 33,016 16,399  21,047 28,105 37,192 16,145 
Netherlands 11,388 12,020 13,751 2,363  17,501 18,334 21,103 3,603  19,302 20,269 23,282 3,980 
Portugal . 2,464 2,944 .   5,850 7,250 .   8,314 10,168 . 
Spain 11,390 5,304 5,487 -5,902  17,681 8,414 8,922 -8,759  19,390 9,210 9,994 -9,395 
Sweden 10,214 9,165 10,662 449  18,151 15,517 18,198 47  23,077 19,777 22,978 -99 
United Kingdom 7,023 7,863 8,448 1,425  12,784 15,165 19,238 6,454  15,209 18,164 22,579 7,370 
               
Mean EU-14 . 8,841 10,468 .  . 15,227 18,744 .  . 18,918 22,691 . 
Standard deviation . 2,866 3,883 .  . 4,264 6,361 .  . 6,427 7,997 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.32 0.37 .   . 0.28 0.34 .   . 0.34 0.35 . 
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Table 2B. Continued 
  Minimum income benefits for single persons   Minimum income benefits for lone parents   Minimum income benefits for two parents 
 1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009  1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009  1990 2000 2009 
change  
1990-2009 
Bulgaria . . 1,196 .  . . 3,852 .  . . 4,567 . 
Cyprus . . 10,532 .  . . 18,651 .  . . 24,010 . 
Czech Republic 4,267 3,006 3,446 -821  10,125 7,028 7,782 -2,343  13,086 8,895 10,206 -2,880 
Estonia . 1,937 2,207 .  . 3,407 4,017 .  . 4,143 4,668 . 
Hungary 8,744 1,834 1,913 -6,831  19,149 3,383 5,998 -13,150  25,042 4,873 5,795 -19,248 
Latvia . . 1,617 .  . . 4,047 .  . . 4,716 . 
Lithuania . . 2,474 .  . . 6,380 .  . . 8,333 . 
Malta . . 8,002 .  . . 13,092 .  . . 13,732 . 
Poland . 2,828 2,658 .  . 5,147 5,867 .  . 6,952 5,929 . 
Romania . . 522 .  . . 1,606 .  . . 1,930 . 
Slovakia 4,095 3,521 3,034 -1,061  7,371 5,871 5,446 -1,926  12,286 7,794 7,256 -5,031 
Slovenia . 4,069 4,736 .  . 12,732 13,191 .  . 13,808 15,115 . 
               
Mean EU-12 . . 3,528 .  . . 7,494 .  . . 8,855 . 
Standard deviation . . 2,941 .  . . 4,960 .  . . 6,151 . 
Coefficient of variation . . 0.83 .   . . 0.66 .   . . 0.69 . 
Note:  Net benefits per year in US dollars, corrected for inflation (2005=100) and PPP; three types of households are presented: single persons, lone parents with two children 
and two parents with two children.  
Data years are around 1990 (Germany, 1991; Hungary, 1992; Czech Republic, Slovakia, 1993).  
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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